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Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith:
Toward a Unified Theory of
First Amendment Exemptions From
Neutral Laws of General Applicability
Brian A. Freeman*

INTRODUCTION
For over fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
tension between the religion clauses of the First Amendment!
The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from aiding religion; the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religion.2 Taken together,
the two clauses mean that religion shall neither incur the government's hostility
nor receive its support. "The [Free Exercise and Establishment] Clauses should
be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a
standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they
should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or
to impose a burden."3 Thus, the government must remain neutral in religious
matters.
The goal of government neutrality in religious matters is easier to state than
to follow. This difficulty can be demonstrated by one simple example: to
compel public school children to attend school on Christmas day, on pain of
risking punishment for disobeying the compulsory education law that requires
school attendance on days prescribed by government, arguably offends the Free
Exercise Clause. Conversely, to close public schools on Christmas day puts the
weight of the government behind a religious holiday, converting the holiday of
religion into a holiday of the state, thereby arguably aiding or endorsing religion

* Copyright © Brian A.Freeman 2001. Professor of Law, Capital University Law
School. A.B. 1962, Oberlin College; J.D. 1965, The Ohio State University. I am grateful
to my Capital colleagues, Daniel T. Kobil and Susan Gilles, who reviewed earlier drafts
ofthis Article, and to John C.Hartranft, Class of 2000, for his research assistance. I am
also grateful for the encouragement and financial support for this Article provided by
Capital Law School Dean Steven C.Bahls.
1. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. Philip B. Kurland, Of Churchand State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1,96 (1961).
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in violation of the Establishment Clause. 4 But so long as we have compulsory
school attendance laws, the government must choose one course over the other.
In spite of the difficulty in achieving true government neutrality in religious
matters, governmental adherence to this principle is essential in order to avoid
the twin evils of aiding religion and infringing upon the free exercise of religion.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to have lost sight of the goal of
government neutrality in religious matters. Over the course of several decades,
the Court has managed to weave a web of confusion around First Amendment
religion issues, not only where tension exists between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, but also where one of the Religion Clauses intersects
with the First Amendment's Speech Clause5 and other clauses protecting
personal freedom. Some Justices argue that the Free Exercise Clause grants less
freedom to religiously motivated conduct than the Speech Clause grants to
identical conduct that is politically motivated; other Justices argue that
religiously motivated conduct should receive more protection than politically
motivated conduct.6 At the same time, the Justices cannot agree on whether the
Establishment Clause restricts religious speech in ways that political speech
cannot be limited
The cause of the tensions between the several constitutional provisions is
not difficult to understand. Rather than adopting an overarching neutrality
theory that applies to both Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court instead has
adopted different tests to determine if challenged government action violates one
clause or another. Although the Court often refers to the neutrality objective of
the Religion Clauses, it has not devised a single test that applies to both.
Consequently, a decision to give maximum protection to one clause inevitably
conflicts with the test used to judge the other, as the following two examples
demonstrate.
For one example, assume that a state university funds non-religious
publications of secular student organizations, but on Establishment Clause
grounds does not fund religious publications of religious student organizations.8

4. For cases interpreting the Establishment Clause, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (using the endorsement and entanglement tests); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992) (holding that coercion can violate the Establishment Clause); Lynch v.

Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (collapsing the purpose and effect prongs ofLemon into
a single test of endorsement, which combined with the additional entanglement prong
yields a two-part test of endorsement and entanglement); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (setting forth legislative purpose, primary effect, and administrative
entanglement as a three-part test).
5. See supranote 2.
6. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Employment Division,
DepartmentofHuman Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);

Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
8. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 819.
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By strictly adhering to the Establishment Clause, the state has imposed a nonneutral standard that favors non-religion over religion. This practice inhibits and
discriminates against religious speech, arguably violating both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.
As a counter example, assume that on free exercise grounds Congress
grants an exemption from compulsory military service to conscientious objectors
whose objection is based on religious training and belief, but does not grant an
exemption to those conscientious objectors whose objection is based on
philosophical, moral, ethical, or personal grounds? This effort to protect the free
exercise of religion nevertheless cannot help but fail the "Lemon test" that, as
regularly used from 1971 until recently, held that the Establishment Clause was
violated by a challenged governmental action that had either the legislative
purpose or primary effect of aiding religion."0 It defies reality to argue that the
legislatively-mandated draft exemption does not have the purpose or primary
effect of giving a preference to religion over non-religion. While the first
example discriminates against religious speech, the second example clearly
favors religion; hence, neither example is neutral.
This Article explores the extent to which the Constitution requires
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability in order to protect the free
exercise of religion. Part I sets forth the current Supreme Court jurisprudence
in this area, focusing on the most recent cases, which suggest that only laws that
are not neutral or generally applicable are subject to strict scrutiny; otherwise,
the majority believes that neutral generally applicable laws are subject to rational
basis review. Part I also includes a discussion of analogous First Amendment
freedom of expression cases, especially the "expressive conduct" cases, in which
the court uses intermediate scrutiny. Part II discusses the purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause, the importance of government neutrality in religious matters
and the freedom of conscience, and concludes by demonstrating how the
Supreme Court's misunderstanding of these points has prevented it from
formulating an overarching theory that harmonizes the two Religion Clauses.
Finally, Part ImI urges that the principle of government neutrality in religious
matters be the overriding concern, leading to the inescapable conclusion that
conduct motivated by religious beliefs should be analyzed by the same standards
as conduct motivated by philosophical, moral, and political beliefs. To maintain
neutrality between religion and non-religion, exemptions from neutral laws of
general applicability should be given to both or to neither. Neither the result, nor
the level of scrutiny, should turn on whether the claimed reason for an exemption
is religious or secular. Intermediate scrutiny is the level of scrutiny proposed for
judging neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden any type of
belief-religious, ethical, philosophical, moral, or political.

9. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965); see infra Part II.B.1.
10. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see alsosupra note 4.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

I. CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION FOR CONDUCT MOTIVATED BY BELIEF:
A SUMMARY OF RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CASES

On both religious and non-religious grounds, claims frequently are made
that individuals should be exempt from laws prohibiting or requiring certain
types of conduct. In spite of the government's obligation under the First
Amendment to remain neutral in religious matters, the Supreme Court
nevertheless has provided different treatment to claims based on religion under
the Free Exercise Clause, and claims based on moral, ethical, philosophical, and
political views under the Free Speech Clause.
A. FreeExercise Cases Before 1990
The Supreme Court's first free exercise case was Reynolds v. United
States," in which the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting polygamy in
federal territories. The statute was challenged by a Mormon who argued that his
religion required him to have more than one wife. Speaking for the Court, Chief
Justice Waite stated that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions."' 2 Thus, the Court drew a
bright-line distinction between belief and conduct: only the former is protected
from abridgment by the government. Although freedom of religious belief is
absolute, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause 3does not exempt those
whose conduct violates otherwise valid criminal laws.'
Cases involving state burdens on religious freedom were just as rare as
cases involving federal burdens. Prior to 1940, the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause was the primary source of what little protection from state
abridgement was afforded to the free exercise of religion. 14 Then, in 1940, in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 5 the Court held for the first time that the Free Exercise
Clause was "selectively incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore applicable against the states. Between 1940 and 1963, the Court

11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12. Id. at 164.

13. Id. at 165. Similarly, many free expression cases draw a distinction between
expression and conduct. That is why, in expressive conduct cases, laws whose purpose
is unrelated to the expression of free expression receive less protection than do laws
whose purpose is related to the suppression of free expression; these latter cases invoke
strict scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79. This distinction between
conduct and belief or expression, although susceptible to vast oversimplification, can be
an appropriate beginning in First Amendment analysis.
14. The most frequently cited case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). But see infra text accompanying notes 201-03 (providing an explanation of a
more persuasive reading of Pierce).

15. 310U.S. 296 (1940).
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decided several free exercise cases, 6 but did not formulate a test to be used in
those cases. Consequently, the Court did not measure Free Exercise Clause
claims against any particular standard ofjudicial scrutiny.
The modem era of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence began in 1963 with
Sherbert v. Verner.17 The employment of Adelle Sherbert, a Seventh Day
Adventist, was terminated because she would not work on Saturday, her
Sabbath. 8 She could not find other employment for the same reason. Her claim
for unemployment compensation was denied because the state agency found that
her circumstances fell within the statutory provision that denied benefits to those
who, without good cause, did not accept employment. 9
For the first time, the Court held that strict judicial scrutiny must apply in
any case where a challenged law impairs the free exercise of religion. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the Court, stated:
If [the challenged action] is to withstand... constitutional challenge,
it must be either because [that action] represents no infringement by
the State of [the] constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any
incidental burden on the free exercise of... religion may be justified
by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate. '0
In spite of this sweeping assertion that strict scrutiny applies to free exercise
claims, the Court has not been faithful to the Sherbert test.2
B. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith'
1. The Majority Opinion and the Standard of Scrutiny
Smith is now the controlling case regarding what level of scrutiny should
be applied when reviewing a claim for an exemption from a valid, neutral law
of general applicability for religiously motivated conduct." In Smith, employees
of a private drug rehabilitation agency were discharged because they ingested
16. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. Id. at 399.
19. Id. at 401.
20. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
22. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. None of the opinions in Smith defined the terms "neutral" and "general
applicability." For a subsequent discussion of the meaning of these terms, see infra text
accompanying notes 44-52.
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peyote, a proscribed hallucinogenic drug, as part of a sacramental ritual in their
Native American church.24 Pursuant to state law, their applications for
unemployment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon because their
' The Supreme Court rejected
discharge was for work-related "misconduct."25
claims that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause rights of the
discharged employees. 26 The majority opinion of Justice Scalia, speaking also
for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy, held that,
because the applicants violated a valid and neutral statute of general
applicability, the Free Exercise Clause was not implicated and therefore strict
judicial scrutiny 27 was inapplicable. Rather, Justice Scalia stated that the
appropriate standard of review was rational basis review.2 8
Justice Scalia made a persuasive argument. He noted that for over one
hundred years29 the Court had "consistently held that the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with 'a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).""'3 The
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny therefore should be determined by the
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
25. Id.

26. Id. at 882.
27. Under strict scrutiny, which is the most stringent level of scrutiny, the law will
be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. The
government has the burden of proving that its interest is vital or compelling, not merely
legitimate, and that the law is necessary, not merely reasonably related, to the
achievement of that end. It is unclear whether "necessary" means that there are "no less
restrictive alternatives" that would suffice to achieve the end or only that the means must
be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the end. Currently, the Court most often speaks of
"narrowly tailored" means. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (quoting Ark. Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 231 (1987) ("[T]he State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.")); see also Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992). For a discussion of the difference between "least
restrictive alternatives" and "narrowly tailored means," see Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); infra note 89 and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 906-07. Under the minimal rational basis standard of review, a law will
be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The burden of
proof is on the challenger; the law will be upheld unless no reasonable person could
reasonably believe that the law in some way will promote a legitimate governmental end.
It is a rare case where the law will not survive rational basis review. See, e.g., United
States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). But see, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
29. Since the decision of Reynolds v. UnitedStates, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
30. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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purpose, not the incidental effect, of the statute: "[I]fprolubiting [or burdening]
the exercise of religion is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended." 31 Consequently, because the First
Amendment has not been offended, a neutral law of general applicability is to
be measured by the traditional rational basis standard of review; only if the law
is not neutral or not of general applicability should strict scrutiny be used?'
2. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun declined to join the
majority opinion. They all insisted that the Free3Exercise Clause was implicated
and that strict scrutiny therefore was required?
In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor categorically rejected
Justice Scalia's analysis?4 Conforming her opinion to the rhetoric, but not the
reality, of prior cases,- Justice O'Connor accused the Court of having
"depart[ed] from settled First Amendment jurisprudence."' She explained:
"There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability..., for
laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious
conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed
at religion."'37 Furthermore, she argued, not only does the Free Exercise Clause
absolutely prohibit government regulation of religious belief, but also:
[T]he 'free exercise' of religion often, if not invariably, requires the
performance of (or abstention from) certain acts .... '[B]elief and

31. 1& at 878.
32. Justice Scalia was careful to limit his opinion in Smith to challenges to "valid
and neutral laws of general applicability." He carefully avoided any claim that rational
basis review would also apply in cases where the very purpose of the challenged law was
to limit the free exercise of religion. However, two years later in Church of the Lukumi
BabaluAye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court, in an opinion joined

almost entirely by Justice Scalia, held that strict scrutiny should apply in such an
instance. See infra Part I.C.1. Thus, in Justice Scalia's view, and in the view of a
majority of the Court, the level ofjudicial scrutiny--strict scrutiny or rational basis-is
determined by whether the challenged law is a valid and neutral law of general
applicability.
33. Justice O'Connor stated that a heightened standard of scrutiny test was met and
therefore concurred in the judgment; the others believed that strict scrutiny was not met
and therefore dissented. See infra text accompanying notes 34-39, 276-81.
34. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
36. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Id.
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action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. Because
the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and
religious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like
the belief itself, must be at least presumptively protected by the Free
Exercise Clause.... [A] law that prohibits certain conduct-conduct
that happens to be an act of worship for someone-manifestly does
prohibit that persons's free exercise of his religion. A person who is
barred from engaging in religiously motivated conduct is barred from
freely exercising his religion. Moreover, that person is barred from
freely exercising his religion regardless of whether the law prohibits

the conduct only when engaged in for religious reasons, only by
members of that religion, or by all persons."
Although Justice O'Connor conceded that "the freedom to act, unlike the
freedom to believe, cannot be absolute," she added that the Court previously had
required "the government to justify any substantial burden on religiously
motivated conduct by a compelling
state interest and by means narrowly tailored
39
to achieve that interest.,

38. Id. at 893 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
39. Id. at 894. Although apparently using strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's
opinion in its entirety also contains elements of intermediate scrutiny. See infra text
accompanying notes 276-82.
Up to this point, Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun. Now, however, she struck out on her own. Although Justice
O'Connor applied a heightened level of scrutiny, she nevertheless rejected the Free
Exercise Clause claim. Noting that "Oregon's criminal prohibition represents that State's
judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one person,
is inherently harmful and dangerous," she stated: "Because the health effects caused by
the use of controlled substances exist regardless of the motivation of the user, the use of
such substances, even for religious purposes, violates the very purpose of the laws that
prohibit them." Smith, 494 U.S. at 905. Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that "the
State in this case has a compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens and that
accommodating respondents' religiously motivated conduct 'will unduly interfere with
fulfillment of the governmental interest."' Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall. He agreed with Justice O'Connor that the compelling interest test was the
appropriate level of judicial review, but felt that the prohibition of the religious use of
peyote in a sacramental ritual, unlike a more general prohibition of far more dangerous
drugs by recreational users, failed to satisfy that standard. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that "[a]lmost half the States, and the Federal
Government, have maintained an exemption for religious peyote use for many years, and
have not found themselves overwhelmed by claims to other religious exemptions." Id.
at 917.
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3. Summary

Ofthe three opinions in the case, only that of Justice Scalia conforms to the
First Amendment's goal of government neutrality in religion. Under his
approach, religions and secular reasons are treated alike in determining whether
individuals should receive an exemption from a valid and neutral law of general
applicability. As will be discussed below' however, Justice Scalia erred in
applying rational basis review.
Justice Blackmun (and Justice O'Connor if she used strict scrutiny rather
than intermediate scrutiny) evinced an approach that yields a distinctly nonneutral result By applying strict judicial scrutiny only where religious claims
are recognized as the basis for the requested exemptions, a preference would be
given to religion over non-religion in determining whether exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability should be recognized. This preference
comes dangerously close to offending the Establishment Clause.
C. The Free Exercise Clause in the Aftermath of Smith
1. Defining the Terms "Neutral" and "General Applicability" to
Determine the Level of Scrutiny:
Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City offHialeah4'
In the ten years since Smith was decided, the Supreme Court has decided
only one free exercise case. In BabaluAye, the Court unanimously struck down
Hialeah city ordinances42 that, as apparent from their text and operation,
prohibited the killing of animals, but only if the animals were killed for religious
reasons. Because the ordinances prohibited animal sacrifices only if performed
for religious purposes, they were neither neutral nor generally applicable.
Consequently, the Court applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the ordinances.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion of the Court was joined only by Justice

40. See infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
41. 508 U.S. 520 (1992). The Santeria religion practiced by the Church originated
in the nineteenth century.
When ... members of the Yoruba people were brought as slaves from
Western Africa to Cuba, their traditional African religion absorbed significant
elements of Roman Catholicism. The resulting [fusion] is Santeria, 'the way
of the saints.' The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called
orishas,through the iconography of Catholic saints.... The basis of the
Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relationship with the orishas,and
one of the principal forms of devotion is animal sacrifice.
Id. at 524.
42. For a discussion of the several city resolutions and ordinances, see BabaluAye,
508 U.S. at 528-30; for the full text of the several resolutions and ordinances, see id. at
548-57 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
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Stevens in its entirety, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined in all but a brief discussion of equal protection.
Of particular importance in Babalu Aye is that, for the first time in a First
Amendment religion case, the Court attempted to define precisely the meaning
of "neutral" and "generally applicable."'43 On the issue of the neutrality of the
ordinances, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, examined the text of the
ordinances and the circumstances surrounding their adoption. First, he examined
the text of the ordinances, stating that "the minimum requirement of neutrality
is that a law not discriminate on its face;"" he found that the Hialeah ordinances
at issue used the words "sacrifice" and "ritual," which suggest a religious
purpose. Even if the ordinances had been facially neutral, however, "[o]fficial
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality." In this case, the
religious ritual of animal sacrifice by members of the Santeria Church was
almost the only conduct prohibited by the challenged ordinances. Furthermore,
Justice Kennedy asserted that the "legitimate governmental interests in
protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed
by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial
practice,"' suggesting that the ordinances were overinclusive. Where laws
"proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends,"
Justice Kennedy was willing to infer, absent "persuasive indications to the
contrary, that a law which visits 'gratuitous restrictions' on religious conduct,.
..,seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests, but to suppress the
conduct because of its religious motivation."'47 Thus, the overinclusiveness of
the regulations indicated that their purpose and effect were to target members of
the Santeria Church for disfavored treatment, thereby discriminating against
religion. Justice Kennedy summarized:
The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The
pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and
their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this
religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered
with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude
almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more
religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate
48
ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral ....

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 546-48.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 538.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 542.
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Justice Kennedy also found that the laws were not of general applicability:
"The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief
is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise
Clause."49 Recognizing that the city can act to protect public health and prevent
cruelty to animals, the challenged ordinances were held to be underinclusive for
those ends, because "the ordinances [were] drafted with care to forbid few
killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice."5
The very
underinclusiveness of the ordinances demonstrated that they were not of general
applicability.
Because the Hialeah ordinances were not neutral laws of general
applicability, the Court held that strict judicial scrutiny should apply:
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance 'interests of the highest order"' and must be
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. The compelling interest
standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements
is not "water[ed] ... down" but "really means what it says."... A
law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances
legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious
motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.5 t
Thus, unlike Smith, the Court in Babalu Aye applied the strict scrutiny
standard of review and invalidated the challenged ordinances. A bright-line
distinction was made between neutral laws of general applicability that impose
incidental burdens on the free exercise of religion and laws that are not neutral
or that are not of general applicability.
Justice Scalia, who wrote for the majority in Smith, wrote an opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that concurred in all significant parts with
Justice Kennedy's opinion. Justice Scalia indicated his view that "neutrality"
and "general applicability" are not only interrelated, but substantially overlap.
Justice Scalia would have preferred to draw a somewhat different distinction
between the two than the distinction drawn by Justice Kennedy:

49. Id. at 543.
50. Id
51. Id. at 546 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 888 (1990); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). In Babalu Aye, Justice Kennedy speaks of strict scrutiny
requiring "narrowly tailored means" in preference to "least restrictive alternatives." In
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), Justice Kennedy discussed the
difference between the two and adopted "narrowly tailored means" as part of the test of
intermediate scrutiny. See infra text accompanying note 89.
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[T]he defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that
by theirterms impose disabilities on the basis of religion...; whereas
the defect of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those
laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design,
construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular
religion for discriminatory treatment. But certainly a law that is not of
general applicability (in the sense I have described) can be considered
"nonneutral"; and certainly no law that is nonneutral (in the relevant
sense) can be thought to be of general applicability. 52
Considering Smith and Babalu Aye together, the Court's position in Free
Exercise Clause cases is clear. The level of judicial scrutiny-strict scrutiny or
rational basis-is determined by whether or not the challenged law is a neutral
law of general applicability."
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act and City ofBoerne v. Flores4
In the aftermath of Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") by overwhelming majorities in both houses
in an attempt to undo the impact of Smith and return to the reasoning of Sherbert
and Wisconsin v. Yoder. RFRA was intended to restore the test of strict judicial
scrutiny whenever a person's free exercise of religion was substantially
burdened, even if the burden resulted from a neutral law of general applicability.
RFRA provided that when the free exercise of religion was substantially
burdened, any governmental body, whether federal or state, was required to
prove that the burden it had imposed furthered a compelling governmental
interest and that the burden was the least restrictive means to further that interest.
The constitutionality of RFRA was raised in City ofBoerne v. Flores. A
Catholic church in Boerne, Texas, had been denied permission to build an
addition to the church, which previously had been designated an historic

52. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557
(1992).
53. Justice White joined the majority in the entire Babalu Aye opinion except for
the discussion of the law's neutrality. Because he was in the majority in Smith, however,
he apparently agreed with Justice Scalia's position. Justice Souter, who was not yet on
the Court when Smith was decided, wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned
the validity of Smith. See Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559-77. Justice Blackmun, with
whom Justice O'Connor joined, concurred in the judgnent; they reaffirmed their position
that Smith was wrongly decided. See id. at 577-80.
54. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
55. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). The Act passed in the House of
Representatives by a voice vote. See 139 CONG. REc. H2363 (daily ed. May 11, 1993)
(passing H.R. 1308). The Act passed in the Senate by a vote of 97 to 3. See 139 CONG.
REC. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (Senate roll call vote No. 331 Leg. on H.R. 1308).
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landmarki 6 The church claimed that the Free Exercise Clause gave it an
exemption from an ordinance prohibiting alterations to historic landmarks,
arguing that RFRA had overturned Smith and reinstated the strict scrutiny test
of Sherbert and YoderY In ruling against the church on federalism grounds
unrelated to the Free Exercise Clause or the thesis of this Article, a seven-Justice
majority invalidated RFRA, at least insofar as it applied to states and their
subdivisions, holding that its enactment exceeded the scope of Congress' powers
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment5 Although the
majority opinion addressed only the issue of the scope of congressional powers,
and not the free exercise issue, the concurring and dissenting opinions did
discuss free exercise.
Justice Stevens, who joined the majority opinion (and who had joined the
majority in full in Smith and Babalu Aye), wrote a short concurring opinion
stating his view that RFRA was a "'law respecting an establishment of religion'"
in violation of the First Amendment. 9 He explained:
If the historic landmark... happened to be a museum or an art gallery
owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from
the city ordinances that forbid the enlargement of the structure.
Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed
that RFRA gives its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an
exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil law.... [T]he
statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or

56. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
57. Id.
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section I of the Amendment contains the Due
Process Clause ("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... "). Although the Bill of Rights applied only as
limitations on the federal government, Barron v. Mayor & City Council ofBaltimore,32

U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Due Process Clause of the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment has been held in a series of cases to have "selectively incorporated" most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and applied them to the states and their
subdivisions. Cantwellv. Connecticut,310 U.S. 296 (1940), is the case commonly cited
as selectively incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ('The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), Congress may enact
legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of Sections I through 4. In Boerne, the
church claimed that RFRA was an example of Congressional "enforcement" of the Free
Exercise Clause as applied to the states and their subdivisions through Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the church claimed that it should receive an
exemption from an historic landmark preservation lav so that it could build an addition
to accommodate more parishioners. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
59. Boerne,521 U.S. at 536.
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agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as
opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.'
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, 6 ' and Justice O'Connor, in a
dissenting opinion,62 engaged in a protracted debate as to the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause, reiterating many of the same arguments that they had made in
Smith.
As the discussion in this part of the Article demonstrates, the Court has
failed to develop a coherent theory to guide its decisions in cases where
individuals claim a religiously-based exemption from the operation of law. Not
only do the Justices disagree on the standard of scrutiny to be used in cases
involving claims of exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, but
also they largely ignore the established jurisprudence surrounding analogous
claims of exemption for conduct motivated by secular philosophical and political
beliefs. A brief examination of analogous Speech Clause cases helps to explain
this inconsistency.
D. Claimsfor Exemptionfor Philosophicallyor
PoliticallyMotivated Conduct
1. Expressive Conduct
The Free Exercise Clause is not the only constitutional provision on which
to ground claims of exemption from valid neutral laws of general applicability.
In somewhat different language, the same issue arises under the First
Amendment's Speech Clause 63 when persons assert that they should not be
punished for engaging in conduct that symbolizes or expresses an idea or belief.
The starting point for expressive conduct analysis is United States v.
O'Brien,6" in which the Supreme Court affirmed O'Brien's conviction for
willfully destroying his draft card in violation of federal law.6' O'Brien argued
that he had burned his draft card at a rally to protest the Vietnam War and to
influence others to adopt his antiwar stance, and that consequently his "symbolic
speech" was protected by the Speech Clause.6
Speaking through Chief Justice Warren, the Court rejected O'Brien's
argument. First, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that "when 'speech' and

60. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also joined this opinion.
62. Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined this opinion on all
but the issue of the powers of Congress.
63. See supra note 13.
64. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65. Id. at 372.
66. Id. at 376.
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'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."61 He then announced
what has become known as the four-part O'Brien test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
The Court rejected the claim that, in light of another federal statute that
made non-possession of a draft card a less serious offense, the purpose of the
challenged federal statute was to punish persons for engaging in conduct that
symbolized their political views. The Court also held that the other parts of the
test were met, and consequently affirmed O'Brien's conviction.
The four-part O'Brientest is flawed. First, the first prong of the test is not
a First Amendment issue. A bedrock principle of constitutional law is that all
government regulations, whether or not they implicate the First Amendment or
other constitutional rights, must be within the constitutional power of
government; i.e., all laws must be passed pursuant to the enumerated or implied
powers of the federal government or the police powers of the state. This
principle simply has nothing to do with the First Amendment.
Second, the third prong of the O'Brien test determines the applicability of
the second and fourth prongs, and thus is a preliminary inquiry that must be
made before the remaining two prongs are examined. That this is the case is
demonstrated by Texas v. Johnson,69 which invalidated a state statute that
prohibited defacing, damaging, or physically mistreating the American flag "in
a way that the actor knows will seriously offend" any person "likely to observe
or discover his action." 0 While agreeing with O'Brien that the "government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in
restricting the written or spoken word," the Court qualified the government's
greater ability to restrict expressive conduct:
[The government] may not... proscribe particular conduct because
it has expressive elements. "[W]hat may be termed the more
generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the
communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 377.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 400.
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that conduct for proscription. A law directed at the communicative
nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified
by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment
requires."'"
Consequently, the Court noted that it has "limited the applicability of
O'Brien'srelatively lenient standard to those cases in which 'the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. ' 72 Therefore, because
"O'Brien'stest 'in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard
applied to time, place, or manner restrictions,'73 [the Court has] highlighted the
requirement that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to
expression in order to come under O'Brien's less demanding rule."'
Johnson is a necessary corrective of O'Brien. In expressive conduct cases,
only if the purpose of the challenged law is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression" will the "relatively lenient" standard or "less demanding" rule
apply.7" But in relation to what standard is the O'Brien standard "relatively
lenient"? And in relation to what rule is the O'Brien rule "less demanding"? As
Johnson indicates, the O'Brien standard is lenient relative to, and less
demanding than, strict scrutiny. Because the state's asserted interest "in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity" was "related
'to the suppression of free expression' within the meaning of O'Brien," the case
was "outside of O'Brien'stest altogether., 76 Therefore, the Court stated, "[w]e
must subject the State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic
character of the flag to 'the most exacting scrutiny."' 77 Because strict scrutiny
was not met, the statute was overturned and the conviction was reversed.
Thus, because the purpose of the challenged law in Johnson was related to
the suppression of free expression, strict scrutiny applied. If, however, the
purpose had been unrelated to the suppression of free expression, the "relatively
lenient" standard or "less demanding" rule of O'Brien would have applied. This
standard combines the second and fourth prongs of the four-part O'Brientest:
If the government regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest, then the law will
be upheld. This test, called "intermediate scrutiny," is less demanding than strict
scrutiny but more stringent than rational basis review. First, the regulation need
71. Id. at 406 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,
622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
72. Id. at 407 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 80-90.
74. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 298).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 410.
77. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
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only further an important or substantial, but not compelling, governmental
interest Second, although strict scrutiny seems to be required by the "incidental
restriction is no greater than is essential" language, intermediate scrutiny requires
only "narrowly tailored" means, not the "least restrictive" means that O'Brien
appears to suggest78 Indeed, to require the least restrictive means would be to
obliterate the distinction in Johnsonbetween regulations whose purposes are and
are not related to the suppression of free expression. The Court in Johnson
recognized this when it stated, as noted above, that the "relatively lenient" or
"less demanding" rule of O'Brien's test "in the last analysis is little, if any
different, from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions."-' As
discussed below, intermediate scrutiny is explicitly used in cases involving
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.
2. Regulations of Time, Place, and Manner
The standards that apply to time, place, and manner restrictions are similar
to the standards that apply to expressive conduct. Just as a determination of
whether the challenged law is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
dictates the level of judicial scrutiny in expressive conduct cases, so also a

78. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly made this point in expressive
conduct cases, other lines of cases invoking intermediate scrutiny have rejected "least
restrictive means" analysis in favor of "narrowly tailored" analysis. With respect to
commercial speech cases, see Boardof Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), and 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,517 U.S. 484,529

(1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring). With respect to First Amendment cases examining
regulations of time, place, and manner, see infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
Paradoxically, the Court also has diluted strict scrutiny by replacing "least restrictive
means" analysis with "narrowly tailored means" analysis. See supra note 27.
Consequently, both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment cases
have rejected "least restrictive means" analysis in favor of "narrowly tailored means"
analysis. In Peny EducationAss'n v. PeryLocal Educators'Ass'n,460 U.S. 37 (1982),

Justice White, in the same paragraph, used "narrowly tailored means" analysis to define
both intermediate and strict scrutiny:
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawnto achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations
of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are
narrowlytailoredto serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.
Id at 45 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Burson v. Freeman,504 U.S. 191, 19798 (1992), Justice Blackmun also used "narrowly tailored means" analysis to define both
intermediate and strict scrutiny. Conversely, equal protection cases that invoke
intermediate scrutiny ask whether the challenged classification is "substantially related"
to the accomplishment of the governmental objective. See infra note 85.
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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determination as to whether a time, place, and manner regulation is "contentneutral" or "content-based" dictates the level of judicial scrutiny to be used in
time, place, and manner cases. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."80 On the other hand, government can
regulate the time, or the place, or the manner of exercising First Amendment
freedoms.8
In Turner BroadcastingSystem v. FCC,82 the Supreme Court held that, as
a general rule, content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny,
whereas content-neutral regulations need only meet intermediate scrutiny.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained:
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.
... For

these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow

and well-understood exceptions,n does not countenance governmental
control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.
Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations
that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content. In contrast, regulations that are

80. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
81. For example, although a city might regulate the time, place, manner, or
duration of holding parades on public streets, the city almost always is constitutionally
prohibited from regulating the content of the speech-the ideas or beliefs-expressed by
the marchers. Parades involve both speech (the communication of a message) and
conduct (the disruption of traffic). The government has important interests to serve in
regulating conduct, but rarely has important interests to serve in regulating speech.
Therefore, if the content of the speech is irrelevant to the regulation of time, place, or
manner, the subject matter ofthe regulation is the conduct, but if the applicability of the
regulation varies according to the content of the speech or the identity of the speaker,
then the subject matter of the regulation is speech itself. See Forsyth County v. The
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 128 (1992).
82. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
83. The exceptions referred to are categories of speech that, precisely because of
their content, are deemed to receive no protection under the First Amendment. These
categories of "unprotected speech" are speech inciting to imminent lawless action, see,
e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); fighting words, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); defamation, see., e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); and commercial speech that proposes an unlawful activity or that is false or
misleading, see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.'
Intermediate scrutiny has been phrased differently in different inds of
cases." In speech cases, intermediate scrutiny generally can be said to require
the challenged regulation to use narrowly tailored means to achieve a substantial
state interest. PerryEducation Ass' v. PerryLocal Educators'Assd'n stated
that, in a public forum, "[t]he State may... enforce regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."' Similarly, Ward v. Rock Against Racism'
explicitly used intermediate scrutiny, and discussed the meaning of the phrase
"narrowly tailored." 9

84. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641-42 (citing, among other cases, Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989), Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
85. In equal protection cases, the standard is stated in words such as "substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest." See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, . . .
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
86. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
87. Id. at45.
88. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
89. Id. at 798-800. Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated:
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation
of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored
to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the
requirement of narrowly tailoring is satisfied "so long as the... regulation
promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation." To be sure, this standard does not mean
that atime, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.
Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals. So long
as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve
the government's interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply
because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately
served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative. "The validity of [time,
place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the
responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for
promoting significant government interests" or the degree to which those
interests should be promoted.
Id (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (citations and footnotes

omitted)).
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Thus, in free speech cases, the Court has used all three levels of scrutiny.
Where there is a regulation of content, or where the purpose of a regulation of
conduct is to suppress free expression, strict scrutiny will be used and rarely will
a regulation be upheld. If the challenged law constitutes a content-neutral
regulation of the time, place, or manner of expressing freedom of speech, or if
the regulation of expressive conduct is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, intermediate scrutiny will be used and the Court will apply a balancing
test, often upholding the challenged regulation." If freedom of expression is in
no way implicated by the challenged regulation, the rational basis test will be
used and the regulation will almost always be upheld.
Because the Court has used both levels of heightened scrutiny in freedom
of expression cases, a superficial analysis might suggest that it would be logical
to also use both standards of review in free exercise cases as well. However, as
Part II demonstrates, the reach of the Free Exercise Clause is more limited than
the Speech Clause. Unlike the Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause does not
recognize exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability. Part III,
however, sets forth a framework-based on other constitutional provisions
(freedom of speech and substantive due process)-whereby persons might
legitimately claim exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE:
GOVERNMENT NEUTRALITY IN RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF

CONSCIENCE; AND THE ERRORS OF SMITH
The confusion surrounding claims of exemptions for religious reasons is
exacerbated by two misunderstandings about the First Amendment. The first is
a general confusion regarding the proper role of the Free Exercise Clause in
constitutional jurisprudence. The second misunderstanding, related to the first,
is the requirement of neutrality between religious and non-religious grounds for
claimed exemptions. This Part addresses both in turn, and then explains how a
proper understanding of these matters leads to the conclusion that the First
Amendment's Speech Clause contains an implied right of conscience. Finally,
this Part describes how misunderstandings of the Free Exercise Clause led to
misguided conclusions on the part of all of the Justices in Smith.

90. Intermediate scrutiny also has been used in First Amendment cases involving
commercial speech. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). CentralHudson Gas held that, if the speech at issue concerns a lawful activity
and is not misleading, it receives First Amendment protection, and is subject to a
standard of intermediate scrutiny that is not unlike that stated above. Id. at 564. The
regulation must be narrowly tailored to further an important governmental interest. More
recent cases, however, reveal that the Supreme Court is divided on what level of scrutiny
should apply in commercial speech cases. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,

517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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A. The Purposeof the Free Exercise Clause

The critics of Smith bemoan the fact that the case did not apply strict
scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burdened
religion.9' This criticism cannot be addressed adequately without a brief
examination of the historical purpose of the Free Exercise Clause. Only by an
appreciation of this purpose can it be determined whether, in Smith, neutrality
was achieved.
The primary historical purpose of the Free Exercise Clause was to
invalidate laws that persecuted or singled out religion for unfavorable treatment.
Because these laws are not neutral or of general applicability, strict scrutiny must
be applied. Although the Hialeah ordinances invalidated in Babalu Aye 2 are
rare examples of recent attempts by government to persecute disfavored
religions,93 persistent and pervasive religious persecution was still fresh in the
minds of the Framers when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted
over two centuries ago. The English Civil War and "Glorious Revolution" of
1688 were caused as much by religious differences as by political differences.'
The Roman Catholicism of James II (and the birth of a Catholic son by his
second wife who took precedence over his Protestant daughters by his first wife)
was perhaps the final straw that caused his overthrow and exile. 9S Even then, of
course, England had not only established the Anglican Church of England but
also had disenfranchised non-Christians and imposed disabilities on nonProtestants and even on dissenters-Protestants who were not members of the
Church of England.' Religious tests and oaths for public office were requiredf
These were not neutral laws of general applicability; these were laws whose
purpose was to persecute and burden those who did not conform to the religious
norm imposed by Parliament
In Everson v. Board of Education,93 Justice Black vividly captured the
oppressive environment of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, and
followed with a description of religious persecution in colonial America:

91. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 559 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. See supratext accompanying notes 41-42.
93. Another such case is McDaniel v. Pa%, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), which held that
a law prohibiting clergy from holding public office violated the Free Exercise Clause.
94. See I BERNARD ScmvARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONsTfUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES pL I1,at 269 (1968); II ScnVARTZ, supra, pt. IH,at 650 (1968).
95. See MARK KI.HLANSKY, A MONARcHY TRANSFORmD 267 (1996).
96. Id. at 263-64, 269-76.
97. Id.
98. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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With the power of government supporting them, at various times and
places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had
persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant
sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of
another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time
persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious
group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a
particular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast into
jail, cruelly tortured and killed.... These practices of the old world
were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new
America. [There was] a repetition of many of the old-world practices
and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed
because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to
jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant
sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a
minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they
steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own
consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters were compelled to
pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose
ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and
consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against
dissenters.99
Although religious tests for holding federal public office were prohibited
in the United States by the original Constitution,"° the Framers of the First
Amendment went much further and provided protection for the general public
from persecution and the imposition of burdens or disabilities by Congress.
Although today government persecution of religion is rare, it was the principal
fear of the Framers. Chief Justice Burger once referred to "the historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who
drafted the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."''
Particularly instructive is Justice Jackson's opinion in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette."° In a single brief passage of the opinion, Justice Jackson concisely
managed to make three critical points: He defended the neutrality goal of the
First Amendment; he discussed the historical purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause; and he explained why the Framers believed that it was necessary to have

99. Id. at 9-10.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
101. Bowen v. Ray, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986).
102. 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
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a Free Exercise Clause separate from the Speech and Press Clauses."
Specifically, Justice Jackson wrote:
In my view, the First Amendment assures the broadest tolerable
exercise of free speech, free press, and free assembly, not merely for
religious purposes, but for political, economic, scientific, news, or
informational ends as well.... I had not supposed that the rights of
secular and non-religious communications were more narrow or in any
way inferior to those of avoved religious groups. It may be asked
why then does the First Amendment separately mention free exercise
of religion? The history of religious persecution gives the answer.
Religion needed specific protection because it was subject to attack
from a separate quarter. It was often claimed that one was an heretic
and guilty of blasphemy, because he failed to conform in mere belief,
or in support of prevailing institutions and theology. It was to assure
religions teaching as much freedom as secular discussion, rather than
to assure it greater license, that led to its separate statement20 4
Given the historical purpose of the Free Exercise Clause to prevent religious
persecution, it becomes easy to address the Smith critics who insist that strict
scrutiny be used in evaluating religious based exemptions to neutral laws of
general applicability. Otherwise, these critics contend, the Free Exercise Clause
is without any independent meaning."°S There are several reasons that this
argument is fallacious.
First, as Justice Jackson's statement shows, the Free Exercise Clause is not
rendered redundant to the Speech and Press Clauses by Smith's failure to subject
a neutral law of general applicability to strict scrutiny. The history of religion,
both in England and in the colonies, necessitated an explicit reaffirmance of the
principle of non-persecution."'

103. Id. at 179.
104. Ia
105. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Constitution ofReligion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701,
718 (1986).
106. Arguably, there is another reason that the Free Exercise Clause and the Speech
and Press Clauses are not redundant. The Free Exercise Clause has been held to severely
limit government attempts to resolve property disputes between different elements of a
religious denomination, see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), orto review
a church's decision to defrock a member of the clergy, see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). For a time, this doctrine of governmental nonintervention in internal church disputes had no equivalent secular counterpart under the
Speech and Press Clauses. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that
First Amendment freedom of association provides constitutional protection from
government interference with the expressive activities of secular expressive associations.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 66

Second, the redundancy among the various clauses of the First Amendment
is not necessarily fatal. The Court consistently has refused to give more favored
treatment to the press under the Press Clause than is accorded to ordinary
persons under the Speech Clause.'0 7 It might be that the Framers intended
considerable overlapping, if not complete redundancy, between all of the rightsprotecting clauses of the First Amendment. Justice Jackson's statement could
lead to the conclusion that the Framers might have believed that some
redundancy was necessary to give the strongest possible statement disallowing
religious persecution, in order "to assure religious teaching as much freedom as
secular discussion."' 08
Third, even though laws persecuting or burdening religion while favoring
non-religion might violate the Equal Protection Clause, any redundancy between
the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses is caused by the latter, not the
former. The Equal Protection Clause is seventy-seven years more recent than
the First Amendment. The fact that the Equal Protection Clause may prohibit
what the Free Exercise Clause already prohibits is no reason to change the
meaning of free exercise in order to come up with a new independent meaning.
It is clear that the Free Exercise Clause itself rendered redundant the Religious
Test Clause of Article VI, °9 but the Court has not attempted to re-define or
broaden the meaning of that clause to give it independent meaning.
Fourth, construing the Free Exercise Clause to be devoid of any meaning
other than non-persecution might render it relatively insignificant, but that would
not render it unique. A Free Exercise Clause so interpreted would be just
another provision of the Constitution that was inserted to address a problem that
no longer exists. The Free Exercise Clause then would be similar to the Third

See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000) (holding the Boy
Scouts of America have a First Amendment expressive associational right to prohibit
gays from serving as scoutmasters); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding the private organizers of a St. Patrick's Day
parade may, under the First Amendment, exclude a group of gays from marching in the
parade). But cf.Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding state's
compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination outweighed right of an
association with both expressive and commercial activities to limit membership to men
only).
107. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (reporters have no more
right than other private persons to tour prisons); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.L, concurring) ("[T]he history of the [press] clause
does not suggest that the authors contemplated a 'special' or 'institutional' privilege.");
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporters have no more privilege under the
Press Clause to maintain confidentiality of sources than do other private persons under
the Speech Clause). But cf Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631

(1975).
108. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the result).
109. See supra note 100.
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Amendment 10 which prohibits the quartering of soldiers in private homes.
Although in colonial times this was thought important enough to deserve its own
constitutional amendment, today the Third Amendment is largely forgotten
because of a long history of no government violations of this clause, thereby
rendering it nothing more than an historic relic. If the Free Exercise Clause
similarly fades into insignificance because governments no longer attempt to do
that which the clause prohibits-the persecution of religion-we should
celebrate, not bemoan, the fact that the government takes the Constitution
seriously. We should not devise a novel interpretation simply to breathe new life
into a moribund constitutional provision.
Finally, there is no evidence that the Framers of the First Amendment
intended to provide exemptions for neutral, generally applicable laws. To be
fair, there is also no evidence that the Framers intended to deny such
exemptions. There simply is no record of the framer's intent on this issue. This
should not be surprising. First, as noted above, the primary concern of the
Framers was to prohibit religious persecution and burdens. Second, the First
Amendment, in common with all of the first eight Amendments,"' was intended
to apply only to the federal government, not to the states, and federal regulations
ofprivate conduct were exceedingly rare. It follows that neutral laws of general
applicability that imposed incidental burdens on religion were non-existent and
probably not contemplated. To ascribe to the Framers an intent to prohibit
neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion lacks both
authority and logic.
B. The Requirement of Government Neutrality as Between Religion
and Non-Religion-Freedom of Conscience
Based on the Speech Clause
The erroneous view that the Free Exercise Clause does more than prohibit
governmental persecution of religion has led to the equally erroneous result that
religion receives more protection under the First Amendment than expression.
Under this misguided view, religious claims for exemption from neutral laws of
general applicability are given more preference than similar claims based on
moral, ethical, philosophical, and political views-a preference that offends the
Establishment Clause. This Article therefore argues that the granting or denial
of exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability cannot vary depending
on the constitutional right underlying the claim. Whether free exercise of
religion, freedom of expression, or substantive due process is the right that
arguably is burdened, courts must treat all claims alike in order to maintain strict

110. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.").
Ill. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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neutrality of government in religious matters. This was the fundamental error
in all of the opinions in Smith.
Different governmental branches and agencies might create exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability. A legislature can devise a system
under which case-by-case determinations can be made by administrative
agencies to award individualized exemptions from duties or prohibitions
imposed by the government". In the absence of legislative exemptions, courts
will be called upon to determine whether a claimed exemption is constitutionally
required. However, any exemption must permit both religious and secular
reasons to qualify as legitimate grounds for exemptions because there are
important non-religious reasons why some persons will seek exemptions from
compliance with government imposed duties or prohibitions.
For example, Thomas v. Review Board ofIndianaEmployment Security
Division"3 held that the state could not deny unemployment compensation to a
Seventh Day Adventist who was discharged because he refused to accept a
transfer in a factory to a department that manufactured munitions." 4 Because the
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division found that Thomas'
refusal to continue employment was without good cause, it denied him
unemployment benefits." 5 The United States Supreme Court upheld his Free
Exercise Clause challenge to the application of the state statute denying him
benefits. The case is explainable on the grounds that the principle of government
neutrality in religious matters demands that both religious and secular reasons
qualify to permit applicants to receive unemployment compensation in spite of
their good faith refusal to continue or seek employment." 6 Therefore, if the state
considers secular reasons for an exemption, then the state also must consider
religious reasons.
But the reverse situation is also true. If the state considers religious reasons
for rejecting employment when offered, then the state also must consider secular
reasons for rejecting employment. While the reasons a person rejects
employment requiring the production of munitions might not be based on
freedom of religion in a narrow sense, they may well be based on equally
expressive secular beliefs; e.g., philosophical, moral, or even political.
Conscientious objectors object to participation in the military (or producing
munitions) because of the intensity of their beliefs, not their source.

112. See infratext accompanying notes 181-84.
113. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Thomas is one of three unemployment compensation
cases arising after, and based on, Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See infra note
182.
114. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720.

115. Id. at 712.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 183-84.
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1. The Draft Exemption Cases as Precedent

Historically, the best known statutory exemption from neutral laws of
general applicability is the exemption from compulsory military service. The
Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires an exemption from
compulsory military service to those who are opposed to participation in war.
Yet every conscription statute ever enacted by Congress has contained some type7
of exemption. The first federal conscription statute was the 1864 Draft Act,"
which "extended exemptions to those conscientious objectors who were
members of religious denominations opposed to the bearing of arms and who
' s
were prohibited from doing so by the articles of faith of their denominations." i
This exemption was clearly non-neutral. Not only did it deny conscientious
objector status to those whose objection was not grounded on religious belief,
but also it committed the sin of "preferentialism" by denying that status even to
those whose objection was grounded on religious belief, if they were not
members of a denomination possessing an article of faith opposing war. The
1864 Draft Act thus favored religion over non-religion, and favored some
religions over others. Similarly, the Draft Act of 1917 gave draft exemptions to
conscientious objectors who belonged to a "well-recognized religious sect or
organization... whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its members to
participate in war in any form.... "" This World War I statute suffered from
the same infirmity as the Civil War statute.
In 1940, Congress broadened the exemption by granting conscientious
objector status to those who, although not members ofa particular denomination,
opposed participation in war because they had individual views based on
"religious training and belief."'20 In 1948, Congress amended the statute to
define "religious training and belief' as "an individual's belief in relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but [which does not include] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."'' This extension of the
exemption was an attempt to eliminate preferentialism among different religions,
but it retained the non-neutral distinction between religion and non-religion.
The Court recognized the lack of neutrality in several cases, interpreting the
statute in such a way as to turn the intent of Congress upside-down, extending
the exemption to those who clearly did not qualify under the plain meaning of

117. 13 Stat. 7,9 (1864).
118. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965) (citing SELECTIE SERVICE
SYSTBI MONOGRAPH No. 11, CoNsCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 40-41

(1950)).

119. Draft Act of 1917,40 Stat. 76,78 (1917).
120. Selective Training & Service Act, 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 301 (1948).
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the statute or the intent of Congress. The Court in United States v. Seeger"
defined "religious training and belief' as follows:
Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are
based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test
might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes
within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established
congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to
service is grounded in their religious tenets.' 3
Although it eliminates preferentialism among different religions, Justice
Clark's language in Seeger raised two questions: how should courts determine
whether religious beliefs are sincere, and how should courts define "religion" so
as to guarantee equal treatment. The task of draft boards and courts "is to decide
whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they
are, in his own scheme of things, religious."'2 4 In defining "religion," Justice
Clark noted that "[r]eligious experiences which are as real as life to some may
be incomprehensible to others"'" and that "the statute does not distinguish
between externally and internally derived beliefs."' 6 Accordingly, Justice Clark
devoted several pages to the writings of various theologians and ethicists,
including Dr. Paul Tillich, Bishop John A. T. Robinson, the Schema of the
Vatican's Ecumenical Council ["Vatican II], and Dr. David Saville Muzzey' 7
In determining whether a registrant's religious beliefs are sincere, Justice Clark
stated:
[W]e hasten to emphasize that while the "truth" of a belief is not open
to question, there remains the significant question of whether it is
"truly held." This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be
resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact-a prime

122. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
123. Id. at 176.
124. Id. at 185.

125. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)).

126. Id. at 186.
127. Id. at 180-83 & n.4. See II PAUL TLLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957);
JOHN A.T. ROBINSON, HONEST TO GOD 11, 13-14, 15-16 (1963); NAT'L CATHOLIC
WELFARE CONFERENCE, PRESS DEP'T, COuI'cL DAYBOOK, VATICAN Il: DRAFT
DECLARATION ON THE CHURCH'S RELATIONS wrrH NON-CHRISTIANS, 282 (Floyd Anderson
ed., 3d Sess. 1965); DAViD SAVILLE MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION (1957).
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consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a
conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for
assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at
their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers."
Not only must the courts (with the help of the F.B.I.) decide whether a
belief system constitutes "religion," but also they must determine if the claimant
is sincere in professing this belief system. Yet, it is impossible for courts to
determine the sincerity of a belief without an inquiry into the reasonableness-or
truth--of the religion. In Braunfeld v. Brown,'" the Supreme Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause was not violated by failing to give Sabbatarians an
exemption from Sunday closing laws." Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a
plurality, stated that such an exemption "might make necessary a state-conducted
inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs, a practice which
a state might believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally
protected religious guarantees..''. Years earlier, in United States v. Ballard,
Justice Jackson doubted that courts could inquire into religious sincerity without
inquiring into religious truth: "If we try religious sincerity severed from
religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations which in
common experience provide its most reliable answer."'' Professor William P.
Marshall asked: "How can one evaluate the sincerity of a religious claim
without evaluating its believability, and if the inquiry into believability is
prohibited by the religion clauses, how can one question sincerity at all?'" The
answer, of course, is that courts cannot properly inquire into either the
truthfilness of a religious belief or the sincerity of its holder. Were there to be
a serious inquiry into sincerity, we would be required to accept the unacceptable:
the in-depth and perhaps contentious probing of witness's religious beliefs in
direct and cross examination in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
Certainly Chief Justice Warren was correct, then, when he suggested that such
inquiries would "run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious
guarantees.'

35

128. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
129. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 609.
131. Id. (footnote omitted).
132. 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), rev'd on othergrounds,
329 U.S. 187 (1946).
133. Id at 93.
134. William P. Marshall, The CaseAgainst the Constitutionalityof Compelled
FreeExerciseExemption, 40 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 357,403 (1989-90).
135. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (plurality opinion).
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As difficult as it is to determine the sincerity of a person's religious beliefs,
it may be even more difficult to define "religion." In his concurring opinion in
Seeger, Justice Douglas was more candid than the majority:
[It is] not a tour deforce if we construe the words "Supreme Being"
to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a
tour deforce so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we
have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from
demise on constitutional grounds.... [A] statute may be strained "in
the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt."' 36
Although Justice Douglas cited only the Free Exercise Clause and equal
protection as causing the "serious constitutional doubt" that would be raised by
a narrow definition of "religious training and belief' and "Supreme Being," there
can be no doubt but that the Establishment Clause also would be offended.
The Court broadened the definition of religion even more in Welsh v.
UnitedStates.'37 Speaking for a plurality, Justice Black stated:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war
at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual
"a place parallel to that filled by... God" in traditionally religious
persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an
individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector
exemption... as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition
to war from traditional religious convictions.' 8
Justice Black conceded that "Welsh's conscientious objection to war was
undeniably based on his perception of world politics."' 39 However, he stated:

136. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953)).
137. 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 340.
139. Id. at 342. Welsh had written to his draft board:

I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the
military complex wastes both human and material resources, that it fosters
disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern) human needs and ends;
I see that the means we employ to 'defend' our 'way of life' profoundly
change that way of life. I see that in our failure to recognize the political,
social, and economic realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our
responsibility as a nation.
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[The] exclusion of those persons with "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code"
should [not] be read to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about
our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious
objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent
upon considerations of public policy. The two groups [excluded] from
the exemption are those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those
whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or
religious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency.14
Justice Black drew a fine line. A claimant is entitled to a conscientious
objector exemption if the objection "is founded to a substantialextent upon
considerations of public policy" but not if the objection "rests solely upon
considerations of policy."' In other words, views on public policy can be the
major consideration driving the person's conscientious objection, so long as it
is not the only consideration. If there is at least a modicum of "moral, ethical,
or religious principle" to accompany public policy considerations, the claimant
wins; if the objection "does not rest at all on moral, ethical, or religious
principle," the claimant loses. 42 This fine line attempts to distinguish between
claims for exemption based on religious (now including moral and ethical)
beliefs and those based on political beliefs. The task of malting this distinction
is doomed. Reasonably intelligent claimants (or their advisors) will simply
assert some moral, ethical, or religious principle to supplement their views of
public policy. Only the most stringent of inquiries into the sincerity of the
claimant, deeply probing his or her motivation and beliefs, might-but probably
will not-enable the decisionmaker to reject the claim. It would be less
intrusive, as well as less time consuming, simply to accept at face value the
claimant's assertion of moral, ethical, or religious principle.
Concurring in the result in Welsh, Justice Harlan was brutally frank.
Although he joined the Court's opinion in Seeger, he now admitted that he had
made a mistake: "[T]he liberties taken with the statute both in Seeger and
today's opinion cannot be justified in the name of... construing federal statutes
in a manner that will avoid possible constitutional infirmities .... ." Rather,
Justice Harlan stated that "limiting this draft exemption to those opposed to war
in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the religious clauses of the
First Amendment."' "

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 342-43.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added).
Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
MISSOURI LWREVIEW

(Vol. 66

Justice Harlan, who earlier dissented in Sherbert,4 ' stated his view that no
draft exemptions for conscientious objectors are constitutionally required. 4 6 In
his view, then, whether there are exemptions for conscientious objectors is not
a matter of constitutional law, but a decision for Congress to make. And if
Congress does choose to exempt conscientious objectors, Justice Harlan said:
[I]t cannot draw a line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs
on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other. Any such
distinctions are not.., compatible with the Establishment Clause..
. The implementation of the neutrality principle requires... "an
equal protection mode of analysis. The Court must survey
meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to
eliminate... religious gerrymanders.' 4 7
Thus, said Justice Harlan, the exemption if applied "must encompass the class
of individuals it purports to exclude, those whose beliefs emanate from a purely
moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The common denominator
must be the
4
intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held."'
The Court's opinions in Seeger and Welsh properly conformed to the
principle of government neutrality in religion. Although the holdings were based
on statutory interpretation, not constitutional principle, they nevertheless are
instructive. Religion should not receive favored treatment, and religious beliefs
should not be preferred over competing belief systems. If religion is preferred,
this sends a message that religious beliefs are more valued, more important, and
more enduring than secular beliefs. "[T]he claim that religion merits special
tribute seems ill-founded in light of establishment and equality-of-ideas
concerns."' 49 Indeed, as Professor Marshall has noted:
Not all religious beliefs are held with equal fervor by the religious
adherent, nor are religious beliefs necessarily more deeply felt than
secular beliefs. A person who has a secular, moral objection to killing
in war and a religious objection to working on the Sabbath might well

145. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
146. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("Congress... could, entirely consistently with the requirements of the Constitution,
eliminate all exemptions for conscientious objectors. Such a course would be wholly
'neutral' and ...
would not offend the Free Exercise Clause .... "). The Supreme Court
appeared to adopt this position, at least as to persons who object only to a particular war,
in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
147. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696
(1970)).
148. Id. at 358.
149. Marshall, supranote 134, at 394.
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suffer a greater psychic harm in being forced to kill than in being
forced to work. 5 '
The draft exemption cases provide guidance for the creation of other
religiously neutral exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability that
incidentally burden religion, expression, and other fundamental rights. To avoid
preferring religion, thereby raising issues of the Establishment Clause and
content-based regulations of speech, the exemption must extend to beliefs that
are moral, ethical, or philosophical, as well as those that are religious. And as
Welsh shows, it is a thin line between moral, ethical, and philosophical concerns
on one hand, and political ("public policy") considerations on the other. Little
is gained from trying to draw a line just short of political beliefs. To include
political beliefs along with religious, moral, ethical, and philosophical beliefs
establishes, under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, a broad freedom
of conscience that guarantees that religion and speech are treated alike. In turn,
this avoids the unwelcome thicket of inquiries into sincerity of belief and the
definition of religion, thereby reinforcing the principle of government neutrality
in religion.
2. Freedom of Conscience Under the Speech Clause
As the draft exemption cases note, true government neutrality between
religion and non-religion can be achieved only if secular reasons, as well as
religious reasons, are recognized as legitimate grounds for granting exemptions
to neutral laws of general applicability. If only religious reasons for exemptions
are permitted, the government has indicated a preference for religious values
over secular values, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. Conversely, if
only non-religious reasons for exemptions are permitted, the system is not
neutral or generally applicable. Rather, it discriminates against religion which,
under strict scrutiny, violates the Free Exercise Clause, the historical purpose of
which is to disallow laws that persecute or single out religion for unfavorable
treatment. Therefore, by recognizing freedom of conscience, the tension
between the two religious clauses can be resolved, and the goal of government
neutrality in religious matters can be achieved. But to be neutral, this freedom
of conscience must be anchored in the Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise
Clause.
The Court has taken some tentative, preliminary steps toward recognizing
a freedom of conscience through the Speech Clause. That Clause has been
interpreted to protect political beliefs from government abridgement. Thus, the
government cannot discharge its employees because of their political beliefs;",

150. Marshall, supranote 134, at 384.
151. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347
(1976).
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base decisions on "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on
political affiliation or support;"' 2 or terminate a relationship with an1 independent
3
contractor for not supporting a political candidate or organization.
So too the government cannot compel persons to express beliefs or ideas
with which they disagree. 4 Thus, although compulsory flag salutes in public
schools may offend the religious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court held
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that it is the Speech
Clause that is offended by a compulsory flag salute.'55 The compulsory flag
salute, said the Court, imposed an "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind."' 56 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the compulsory flag salute
"transcends constitutional limitations on [the government's] power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
... to reserve from all official control."' 57
Similarly, Wooley v. Maynard.. held that Jehovah's Witnesses could not
be punished for making illegible that portion of their New Hampshire license
plate that contained the state motto, "Live Free or Die."' 59 Although George and
Maxine Maynard asserted that punishing them violated their rights to the free
exercise of religion, the Court grounded its opinion on the Speech Clause.
Noting that the Maynards found the state motto to be "morally, ethically,
religiously, and politically objectionable,"'" Chief Justice Burger stated that:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
... includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all. A system which secures the right to proselytize
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of "individual freedom of the
mind."'1'
It is interesting that Chief Justice Burger grounded his opinion in Wooley
broadly on the Speech Clause, not narrowly on the Free Exercise Clause. His
decision to do so contrasts starkly with his earlier opinion in Wisconsin v.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
(1943)).

See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990).
See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 642.
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 714 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
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Yoder,"r in which he could not have made it more clear that only claims based
on religion could be the basis for an exemption from compulsory education laws.
Yet in Wooley, by speaking of "the right to proselytize religious, political, and
ideological causes" and the "complementary components ofthe broader concept
of freedom of the mind," Chief Justice Burger recognized the inherent unity of
the First Amendment.'6
Although Jehovah's Witnesses were the claimants in both Barnette and
Wooley, it is significant that in both cases the Court preferred to rely on the
Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause. While both clauses yield the same
outcome of protecting religion, only the use of the Speech Clause, not the Free
Exercise Clause, serves the goal of government neutrality as between religion
and non-religion. Furthermore, by relying on the Speech Clause rather than the
Free Exercise Clause as the anchor for a freedom of conscience, the Court was
able to avoid inquiries into the sincerity of the claimants' religious views and the
definition of religion itself. As Professor William P. Marshall observed: "[In
Wooley, the Court did not have to inquire into the genuineness and import of the
challenger's objections to find the law constitutionally infirm. The mere fact that
the dissident found the views the government
sought to coerce abhorrent was
'
sufficient to strike down the legislation."' 6
Professor Marshall has long held the view that free exercise is expression,
and that the Speech Clause therefore includes a freedom of conscience:
Generally, religious conscience is affirmed through expressive
activities manifesting closely held religious beliefs, or is most
substantially infringed when it is violated by laws requiring a contrary
manifestation. Both of these aspects of religious conscience, however,
are protected by free speech principles. Prayer, worship, and ritual are
all protected within freedom of expression, and Wooley v. Maynard
and its progeny accord a broad protection to religious conscience by
recognizing a freedom from coercive beliefs.t"
Barnetteand Wooley, of course, created a freedom of conscience based on
the Speech Clause in the context of freedom from state-compelled speech.
Furthermore, they did not involve neutral laws of general applicability. By
coercing individuals to utter specific words or to display a particular motto, the
regulations were the antithesis of neutral. Content-based regulations of speech
are one of the greatest evils that offend the First Amendment, and thus strict
scrutiny, not intermediate scrutiny, is appropriate. Nevertheless, it is but a step

162. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see infra text accompanying notes 204-08.
163. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette,319 U.S. at 637).
164. William P. Marshall, Solving the FreeExercise Dilemma: Free Exerciseas
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 589-90 (1983).
165. IL at 588.
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from holding that government-compelled speech violates a person's conscience
to a holding that there is a broad right of conscience that may afford persons
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability when a constitutionally
protected right other than free exercise of religion is incidentally burdened. This
point was made by the Supreme Court in Princev. Massachusetts,' in which
the Court upheld the applicability of child labor laws to a nine year old girl who,
at the behest of her aunt and guardian, engaged in the sale of religious literature
for the Jehovah's Witnesses."6 Sarah Prince conceded explicitly that the Press,
and implicitly that the Speech Clause did not apply, and based her First
Amendment claim entirely on the Free Exercise Clause. 6 The Court, speaking
through Justice Rutledge, emphatically rejected the argument that the Free
Exercise Clause is superior to the Speech and Press Clauses, and recognized the
essential unity of the First Amendment:
If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of [religious]
conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may
be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First
[Amendment] can be given higher place than the others. All have
preferred position in our basic scheme. All are interwoven there
together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes appropriate
for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime place
because they have unity in their human sources and functionings.
Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment
are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But in the everyday
business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of
personality can find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They
cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life.'69
The failure of the Court to understand the proper role of the Free Exercise
Clause, the slighting of the goal of government neutrality in religious matters,
and the selective non-recognition of a freedom of conscience based on the
Speech Clause all contributed to the erroneous conclusions reached by all of the
Justices in Smith. Further analysis of this case therefore is necessary.

166. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
167. Id. at 170.
168. Id. at 164.
169. Id. at 164-65. This unitary view of the First Amendment later was repeated
in Heffron v. InternationalSocietyfor Krishna Consciousness,Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
Heffron applied the Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause, to a claim by a religious

group to a right to distribute literature, sell literature, and solicit donations at a state fair.
See infra text accompanying notes 235-41.
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C. The Errorsof Smith

In Smith, a majority of the Court applied rational basis review to claims of
religiously-based exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability because
of their belief that these claims were outside the scope of the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause. 7 ' Although the Court is willing to use a balancing
approach in cases where an individual asserts a free speech defense to his or her
non-compliance with a regulation that is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression,' the Smith majority preferred a categorical approach for individual
claims involving free exercise exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability. In so doing, most of the Justices in the Smith majority apparently
would give more protection (under a balancing approach) to politically
motivated conduct than they would give (under a categorical approach) to
religiously motivated conduct." Clearly this is not neutral as between religion
and non-religion. Although this approach avoids a potential violation of the
Establishment Clause, the different analysis of speech and religion cases seems
to be a clear violation of the non-discrimination/persecution principle of the Free
Exercise Clause. Conversely, the dissenting Justices in Smith apparently would
give more protection to religiously-motivated conduct than to expressive
conduct. 73 This too is not neutral, for it offends the Establishment Clause.
In fairness to Justice Scalia, it must be noted that he was the only Justice in
Smith who insisted on treating expressive conduct and religiously-motivated
conduct alike. He likes applying the O'Brientest to expressive conduct cases no
more than he likes applying the strict scrutiny test to cases involving religion-

170. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990).
171. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,566 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment' and explicitly
applying the four-part O'Brien test). Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion was
joined by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. Although Justices White and Stevens
dissented in Barnesbecause they believed that the regulation was not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, they also would have used the O'Brien intermediate
scrutiny test had they agreed that the regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.
172. This includes Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
Kennedy, all of whom gave more protection (under intermediate scrutiny) to expressive
conduct, see, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566, than they did (under rational basis scrutiny)
to religiously-motivated conduct in Smith.
173. Justice O'Connor would invoke the compelling interest test in religion cases,
thus perhaps giving more protection to free exercise claims than to expressive conduct.
Justices Marshall, Blacknn, and Brennan (and perhaps the latter's successor, Justice
Souter, see City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 565 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting),
would give more protection to religiously-motivated conduct (under strict scrutiny) than
to expressive conduct (under intermediate scrutiny).
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based claims of exemption from neutral laws of general applicability; he would
apply rational basis review in both situations. Concurring in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre,Inc.,' 74 Justice Scalia stated that a statute prohibiting live nude dancing
"must be upheld, not because it survives some lower level of First Amendment
scrutiny [the O'Brien test], but because as a general law regulating conduct and
not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny at all.'"7 Justice Scalia also has taken a similar position in a case
arising under the Press Clause of the First Amendment:
[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on
its ability to gather and report the news.... [E]nforcement of such
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than
would be applied
to enforcement against other persons or
176
organizations.

At least Justice Scalia is consistent. In no case arising under the First
Amendment--speech, press, or religion-would he give any First Amendment
protection to neutral laws of general applicability. Thus, his categorical
approach avoids the error of other Justices in the majority in Smith of preferring
non-religious reasons over religious reasons for seeking an exemption from
neutral laws of general applicability, but he does so at the cost of giving
absolutely no First Amendment protection, under any clause, to conduct
motivated by religious, philosophical, or political considerations. At the same
time, of course, he avoids the error made by the dissenting Justices in Smith of
preferring religious reasons over non-religious reasons for seeking such
exemptions.
In their insistence on using strict scrutiny, Justices O'Connor, Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall conformed their opinions to the rhetoric, but not the
substance, of Free Exercise Clause cases decided after 1963, when Sherbertfirst
mandated that strict scrutiny was to be used in free exercise cases. Justice Scalia
was surely correct in his Smith opinion when he noted that all of the Court's free
exercise cases between Sherbert and Smith invariably claimed to be applying
strict scrutiny, but in fact did not. In fact, in that twenty-seven year period, the
Court decided seventeen free exercise cases. Although purporting to apply strict
scrutiny in all of them, the religious claimant lost thirteen times. 177 Three of the
four remaining cases dealt with claims for unemployment compensation and

174. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
175. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
176. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991).
177. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct:
An IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992).
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were indistinguishable from Sherbert; the fourth was Yoder. 7 ' This record of
four wins and thirteen losses, in situations where the most stringent standard of
judicial review is purportedly applied, stands in stark contrast to freedom of
expression cases, where in only one case"7 9 has the Court purported to use strict
scrutiny review and yet upheld the regulation. Similarly, in equal protection
cases involving racial discrimination, the Court has only once, in a dubious case
decided over fifty years ago,' upheld a racial classification or regulation when
scrutinized under strict judicial scrutiny. Therefore, Justice Scalia is correct to
assert that strict scrutiny in free exercise cases, unlike freedom of expression
cases, is only the form, not the reality, of the Supreme Court's free exercise
jurisprudence. His rationale for the outcome of the cases that upheld the free
exercise claim, although not the stated basis for any of their holdings, is
persuasive, and suggests alternative grounds for the decisions that are doctrinally
more sound than the grounds actually used by the Court.
In his attempt to reconcile the holding in Smith to prior cases-both before
and after Sherbert-thatupheld free exercise claims, Justice Scalia asserted that
these few cases shared one of two characteristics. Some of the cases examined
state unemployment compensation laws that denied benefits to applicants who
were unwilling to work under conditions forbidden by their respective religions.
Most of the remaining cases were "hybrid" cases that involved free exercise
rights coupled with other fundamental rights that were unrelated to the free
exercise of religion, usually freedom of speech.
1. Unemployment Compensation Cases
One line of cases giving religiously motivated conduct an exemption from
neutral laws of general applicability examines the denial of unemployment
compensation to applicants who are unwilling to work under conditions
forbidden by their respective religions. The leading case is Sherbertv. Verner, '
in which the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was violated by
the denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist whose
inability to find employment resulted from her refusal to work on Saturday, the
day of her Sabbath. Following the same rationale, three subsequent cases, all

178. See infranote 182.

179. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion). Burson
upheld a Tennessee statute prohibiting campaigning at polling places. Although Justice
Blackmun claimed to be using strict scrutiny, Justice Stevens' dissent persuasively argues
otherwise, concluding that the plurality's "exacting scrutiny" actually was "toothless:'
Id at 226.
180. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Ironically, this first
case to apply strict scrutiny in cases involving racial or national origin classifications
upheld the relocation of Japanese Americans during World War H1.
181. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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decided in the 1980's also held that the Free Exercise Clause was violated by the
denial of unemployment compensation in similar situations.'
Justice Scalia in his Smith opinion noted that, under the unemployment
statutes at issue in Sherbert and its progeny, "aperson was not eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits if, 'without good cause,' he had quit work
or refused available work. The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism for
individualized exemptions."' 83 Therefore, said Justice Scalia, "our decisions in
the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system
to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."'" With this
characterization, Justice Scalia engaged in revisionism. A close reading of all
four unemployment compensation cases demonstrates that the rationale
advanced by Justice Scalia was not the stated ground for any of the decisions.
Not one of the cases suggested that exemptions for religious reasons had to be
given because exemptions were being given for secular reasons. The tenor of
all four cases was that, whether or not exemptions are given for non-religious
reasons, exemptions for religious reasons are constitutionally required by the
Free Exercise Clause.
In spite of his revisionism, however, Justice Scalia's characterization of the
unemployment compensation cases nevertheless was particularly apt in that it
provided a more sound and persuasive rationale by which to explain these cases.
Although all four cases purported to use strict scrutiny to invalidate a neutral
generally applicable law, the cases actually could have been, and should have
been, decided on the narrower grounds proposed by Justice Scalia: If the state
has an unemployment compensation program, and if the state affords
individualized hearings to examine whether the grounds for not working affords
a person an exemption, then religious as well as secular reasons must be
examined to determine if an applicant has declined employment "with good
cause."' 85 Were this the basis for the decision in all four cases, the cases would

182. See Frazee v. 11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (Christian
who refused to work on Sundays); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136 (1987) (Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness who
refused to work in a factory that manufactured munitions).
183. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
184. Id. (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708).
185. Justice Scalia appears to have adopted the reasoning earlier expressed by
Justice Stevens. Explicitly referring to those same unemployment compensation cases,
Justice Stevens earlier had stated:
In each case the treatment of the religious objection to the new job
requirements as though it were tantamount to a physical impairment that made
it impossible for the employee to continue to work under changed
circumstances could be viewed as a protection against unequal treatment
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not stand for the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause demands that
religiously motivated conduct receive an exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability. Rather, these cases would reinforce the argument that religion and
non-religion should be treated alike: both religious and secular reasons can
qualify to permit applicants to receive unemployment compensation in spite of
their refusal to continue or seek employment.
It should not matter whether Eddie Thomas's refusal to work in a munitions
factory was because he was a Jehovah's Witness who for purely religious
reasons was conscientiously opposed to any participation in military activities'8
or whether, like Messrs. Seeger and Welsh in the Vietnam era draft exemption
cases, his refusal was anchored on his deeply held, intense beliefs against
participation in war of any kind." Similarly, just as some applicants cannot be
denied unemployment compensation because of their refusal to work on their
respective Sabbath, others should not be denied compensation because their
refusal to work on a Saturday or Sunday is based on secular reasons, e.g., a noncustodial parent who is able to see his or her children only on week-ends, and
who holds a strong secular conviction that he or she must spend considerable
time on weekends with the children. Although it might be less common for
secular reasons than for religious reasons to justify a refusal to work on Saturday
or Sunday, at least the possibility must remain open in order to maintain

rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious sect.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Similarly, in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,722 n.17 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring),
Justice Stevens asserted that "the granting of a religious exemption was necessary to
prevent the treatment of religious claims less favorably than other claims." In Bowen,
Justice Stevens discussed whether the federal government could impose an obligation on
a Native American to provide a social security number or file other required forms in
order to receive cash assistance, medical assistance, and food stamps when the Native
American asserted a religion-based objection. Id. at 716-23. Noting that others might
"[find] difficulty in providing [the required] information on pertinent forms," Justice
Stevens observed:
Current regulations suggest that assistance for such difficulties may well be
available in the programs at issue, particularly for those with mental, physical,
and linguistic handicaps that prevent completion of the required forms, or
other required steps in the application process. To the extent that other food
stamp and welfare applicants are, in fact, offered exceptions and special
assistance in response to their inability to "provide" required information, it
would seem that a religious inability should be given no less deference. For
our recent free exercise cases suggest that religious claims should not be
disadvantaged in relation to other claims.
MEt at 720-22 (footnotes omitted).

186. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707.
187. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970); see also supratext accompanying notes 122-50.
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neutrality as between religion and non-religion in the allowance of exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability.
It is significant that Justice Scalia limited the appropriateness of using strict
scrutiny, in cases where there is a claim of a religiously based-exemption from
a neutral law of general applicability, to situations where the law creates "a
mechanism for individual exemptions;" the state must consider religious along
with non-religious reasons for quitting or refusing work. This process is neutral
between religion and non-religion, and stands in stark contrast with Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,' which held that the Establishment Clause was
violated by a statute that provided that no person could be required by an
employer to work on his or her Sabbath:
The statute arms Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified
right not to work on whatever day they designated as their Sabbath..
• . The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace
[without taking] account of the convenience or interests of the
employer or those of other employees who do not observe a
Sabbath. 89
The vice of the statute was to favor absolutely all religious reasons, over all
other, non-religious, reasons for not working on the Sabbath. This statute was
not neutral; it violated the Establishment Clause. Thus Justice Scalia was right:
In spite of its expansive language, Sherbert and its progeny should not be
understood as justifying an exception to the requirement of government
neutmlity in religion; rather, viewed in its proper context, those cases reinforce
the neutrality requirement. Religious and secular reasons must be considered
equally in granting exceptions to requirements that employees work on particular
days of the week.
It is important to understand accurately what Justice Scalia meant by the
statement that "where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,
it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without
compelling reason.""' If he had meant that any refusal to exempt a person for
reasons of religious hardship must be measured by strict scrutiny, he would have
defeated his objective. For example, zoning ordinances, landmark preservation
laws, and other land use regulations typically provide for variances granted as
"individual exemptions" on a case-by-case basis. Clearly Justice Scalia would
not apply strict scrutiny to a decision of the Boerne, Texas zoning commission
to deny a variance sought by a church so that, for its asserted religious reasons,

188. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
189. Id. at 709.
190. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (quoting
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
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it could build
an addition to its "landmark" church to accommodate more
191
worshipers.

Rather, Justice Scalia meant that the categorical refusal to give any
consideration to religious hardship whatsoever, while giving consideration to
non-religious reasons for seeking an exemption, triggers strict scrutiny. This
reasoning is sensible. Either government must consider both religious and nonreligious reasons in a system of individualized exemptions, or it must consider
neither, in which case the state will have no system for individualized
exemptions. It is not neutral to consider non-religious reasons and not religious
reasons, or vice versa. If the system of exemptions is not neutral between
religion and non-religion, the validity of the non-neutral system itself should be
measured by strict scrutiny. But if the system is neutral, and both religious and
non-religious reasons are equally considered, then the individual decision itself
to deny an exemption need not be measured by strict scrutiny. Intermediate
scrutiny is ideal for ajudicial examination of these individual decisions.
2. "Hybrid" Cases
In his examination of the "hybrid" cases, Justice Scalia asserted that close
examination of those cases yielded the conclusion that it was the "other"
constitutional right, not the Free Exercise Clause, that led the Court to invoke
strict scrutiny and invalidate the challenged law. Some of the hybrid cases were
decided solely on the basis of the Speech Clause;' the Free Exercise Clause
played no role in their outcome. Although those challenging the government
action usually invoked both the Free Exercise Clause and the Speech Clause, the
Court carefully relied only on the Speech Clause in these cases, not reaching the
free exercise issue.
Other similar cases were decided on a combination of both free exercise and
freedom of expression grounds."9 In all of these "hybrid" cases where the

191. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,537 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(repeating his arguments made in Smith).
192. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down the compulsory
display of the state slogan on New Hampshire license plates, "Live Free or Die," that
offended the religious beliefs of those challenging the law); W.Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a compulsory flag salute statute that
offended the religious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses).
193. Compare Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a system
of licensing for religious and charitable solicitation where the licensing public official
had arbitrary discretion to grant or withhold licenses), with Follett v. Town of
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (both
involving a tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas), Hague
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) (where only the Speech Clause was used to invalidate similar arbitrary
licensing of speech for a religious and a non-religious organization respectively).
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Supreme Court held that an exemption from a neutral law of general
applicability was required, the Speech (or Press) Clause was or could have been
the sole basis for the decision. 94 All of these cited cases were decided before
Sherbertheld that strict scrutiny was to be used in free exercise cases.
Justice Scalia was accurate in noting that virtually all of the nonunemployment compensation cases that upheld claims for exemption from
neutral laws of general applicability implicated the Speech and Press Clause of
the First Amendment. Many of these cases, decided in the 1930's and 1940's,
were called "The Jehovah's Witnesses Cases" to identify and signify the belief
system of those who raised the claims.195 Even where the Free Exercise Clause
was cited, however, the Speech Clause alone would have been sufficient to
justify the outcome. Justice Scalia was not the first to acknowledge this point.
In 1973, Professor Leo Pfeffer examined the Jehovah's Witnesses cases and
noted:
The chronicle can be summed up briefly and starkly: In every
case in which a claim under the free exercise clause was upheld, it was
bracketed with a free speech or free press claim; conversely, whenever
free exercise stood alone it was unsuccessful. Realistically, free
exercise did not have a separate but equal existence, or even one that
was separate and unequal; it had practically no existence at all. 96
Justice Scalia's use of the word "hybrid" was unfortunate, for it suggests
that, while neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the "other" right standing alone
justifies an exemption from a neutral generally applicable law, the combination
of the two rights does justify such an exemption. This comes perilously close
to an argument that the "hybrid" right is found not in any specific constitutional
provision, but in the peripheries, penumbras, and emanations of several
constitutional provisions. Fortunately, this argument, advanced by Justice
Douglas in Griswoldv. Connecticut,'9 has since been abandoned. Furthermore,
Justice Scalia's argument is conceptually flawed in that it implies that, while
rational basis review is to be used where either free exercise or the "other" right
stands alone, when the two are combined it suddenly becomes appropriate to use
strict scrutiny. Yet, we know that rational basis is not the appropriate test to use
in judging the validity of regulations of free speech or press; when that right is
implicated the level of scrutiny-usually strict scrutiny-does not vary
depending on its combination with another right.
194. Thus, Justice Scalia supports the thesis that Professor Marshall has long

advanced. See Marshall, supra note 164; Marshall, supranote 134.
195. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296; Lovell, 303

U.S. at 444.
196. Leo Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1130

(1973).
197. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Justice Scalia's invention of the "hybrid" theory was disingenuous. He
would have been more forthcoming had he stated the simple truth that in all of
the cases noted, at least those where the "other" right was freedom of speech or
press, the "other" right was itself fully sufficient to invalidate the governmental
action, with no need to rely, even in part, on the Free Exercise Clause. As
Professor Pfeffer noted, the Free Exercise Clause "had practically no existence
at all" in these cases.'
This explanation of the "hybrid" cases that implicated freedom of
expression leaves only two other "hybrid" cases identified by Justice Scalia that
do not involve the Speech (or Press) Clause as the "other" constitutional right:
Piercev. Society ofthe Sisters'" and Yoder, both of which were cited by Justice
Scalia as implicating "the right of parents... to direct the education of their
children... ."' Pierceis an anomaly that easily can be disposed of once it is
recognized that it was a typical case of the Lochner era? ' Frequently cited as
holding that states must permit compulsory school attendance laws to be fulfilled
through attendance at parochial schools, Pierceactually was decided on the basis
of the now-discredited "liberty of contract" doctrine that parochial schools have
an economic right to engage in the business of education. Although Justice
McReynolds in dicta, limited to a single paragraph, referred to the "liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control," 2' substantive due process in 1925 did not extend much beyond
economic rights. More to the point of Pierce and this Article, and in line with
the prevailing liberty of contract jurisprudence prevailing at that time, Justice
McReynolds stated:
Appellees are corporations... [that] have business and property
for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising
over present and prospective patrons of their schools....
[Appellees] asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and
unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent
destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear and
immediate, within the rule approved in... [many] cases where

198. Pfeffer, supranote 196, at 1130.
199. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
200. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
201. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is considered to be
the high-water mark of the liberty of contract-substantive due process doctrine that was
in vogue in the first third of the twentieth century. See, e.g., ERwIN CHEhMRINSKY,
CoNsTrTUToNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIS 480-86 (1997).
202. Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35.
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injunctions have issued to protect business enterprises against
interference with the freedom of patrons or customers.2 3
Without a doubt, then, "liberty of contract" was the true basis for the holding,
not any right to an exemption of religiously motivated conduct from neutral laws
of general applicability. Furthermore, Pierce was decided decades before the
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review was first applied to Free Exercise
Clause cases in Sherbert. Indeed, Pierce was decided before Cantvell
selectively incorporated the Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Therefore, Pierce furnishes no authority for the existence of a substantive
due process right of parents to direct the education of their children.
Consequently, only Yoder squarely stands for the proposition that strict scrutiny
is to be used whenever there is a claim of a religiously based Free Exercise
Clause exemption from a neutral law of general applicability. Yoder invalidated
a Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law as applied to Old Order Amish
who, for religious reasons, refused to send their children to school past the eighth
grade. 2 Yoder is far more difficult to pass off as a "hybrid" case than those
cases implicating freedom of expression as the "other" constitutional right.
Certainly the Court in Yoder referred to no right other than free exercise. Just
as Yoder misrepresented Pierce by stating that "the Court's holding in Pierce
stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of
their children," 205 so too Justice Scalia misrepresented Yoder's reference to the
"interests of parenthood" 2' by claiming that Yoder was a "hybrid" case
involving "the right of parents.., to direct the education of their children. 20 7
This was not so. Indeed, by its insistence on limiting its holding to the facts, the
Yoder Court made it clear that non-religious reasons never would suffice to grant
a similar exemption to others. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
stated:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed
as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations; to have protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a
determination of what is a "religious" belief... may present a most
delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes
allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 535-36 (citations omitted).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
Id. at 233.
Id.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/7

46

Freeman: Freeman: Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith:

2001]

EXPIATING THE SINS OFYODER AND SMITH

the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal
rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of
the Religion Clauses.203
Even a cursory reading of Chief Justice Burger's opinion yields the
inescapable conclusion that this was no "hybrid" right to which he referred. He
could not have been more clear that claims based on religion, and only claims
based on religion, could ever be the basis for such an exemption. Although it
might have been preferable from a standpoint of doctrinal consistency for the
Court to have based its decision on a broader substantive due process "right of
parents to direct the education of their children," that is not what the Court did.
Indeed, the Court went out of its way to explicitly disavow any broader rationale.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia asserted that in Yoder, as in the other just-discussed
cases, it was the "other" constitutional right, not the right to free exercise of
religion, that was dispositive.
Yoder was the one free exercise case that did not fit Justice Scalia's model.
Unlike the unemployment compensation cases, Yoder could not logically be
squared with his conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated by
neutral generally applicable laws. Thus, the "hybrid" theory attempted to
distinguish that which could not be distinguished. It is clear that Justice Scalia
did not think that Yoder ever should have been tied to the Free Exercise Clause
in the first place; his invention of the "hybrid" theory was an attempt to
disconnect the case from its First Amendment moorings. It may well be that the
"hybrid" theory is nothing more than "an unprincipled attempt to pretend that
Yoder survived Smith."'
Although it was disingenuous of Justice Scalia to characterize Yoder as a
"hybrid" case, he was right to reject its rationale. While the Yoder Court's
opinion can be described only as a free exercise case, the result logically can be
explained only as a case involving the substantive due process right ofparents
to control the education of their children. Chief Justice Burger's reasoning is
utterly inconsistent with the goal of achieving neutrality under the First
Amendment
The language from Yoder quoted above condemns the opinion. It was bad
enough that Chief Justice Burger needlessly favored religion over non-religion
in finding an exemption from compulsory school attendance laws. Even worse,
the Chief Justice expressed a strong preference for some religions over others.

208. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
209. Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Declineofthe Supreme
Court-Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 267.
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From a reading of his opinion, it appears that few other religious groups could
successfully make the argument of the Amish. Chief Justice Burger devoted a
major part of his opinion to the inseparability and interdependence of the Amish
faith and way of life. Under his fact-bound reasoning, very few religions-and
no secular associations-could claim the constitutional protection that the Court
gave to the Amish in Yoder. Perhaps worst of all, the Chief Justice did not even
consider the possibility that there might be devout individuals, not members of
an organized religious denomination, who for either religious or non-religious
reasons oppose compulsory school attendance.
Therefore, not only did Yoder commit the sin of preferring religion over
non-religion, but also it committed the sin of "preferentialism" by preferring
some religions over other religions. The case is utterly inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause. This was of no worry to Chief Justice Burger, who
cavalierly brushed off the problem:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general
obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the
Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent
any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values
promoted by the right of free exercise."'
It would have been much more sound constitutionally had Yoder explicitly
relied on a substantive due process "right of parents to direct the education of
their children," with no need to combine it with, or even to refer to, the right of
free exercise of religion. The exemption mandated by the Court could easily
have been extended to other religious groups and individuals, and to nonreligious groups and individuals, including those who for a wide variety of
religious and secular reasons have deeply-held beliefs in "homeschooling"-perhaps even extending to Henry David Thoreau and his children
at Walden Pond. The exemption would have been broader, and would have'
avoided the constitutional difficulties in preferring religious to secular reasons
to require an exemption from compulsory school attendance. It would, in other
words, have been neutral."'
Alternatively, Chief Justice Burger could have relied upon an implied right
of conscience under the First Amendment Speech Clause to give an exemption
to both religious and non-religious groups and individuals. Professor Marshall
made this point long before Smith:

210. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
211. Chief Justice Burger may have invoked the narrow free exercise view rather
than the broad substantive due process view because the latter would have conflicted
with his narrow view of abortion rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was pending
at the time.
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The claim cited in Yoder, freedom from compulsory education, is so
akin to what has traditionally been considered a free expression claim
that it is questionable whether the case was properly decided on free
exercise grounds. First, the Amish sought to have their children free
from the influence of secular education, which implicated their
associational rights in being forced to attend a public school. Second,
as noted by Professor Pfeffer, the issue in Yoder might well be
described as the freedom to learn, or perhaps not2t2to learn, a right
traditionally in the province of the Speech Clause.
BI. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
HARMONIZING RELIGIOUS, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL CLAIMS
OF EXEMPION FROM NEUTRAL LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
As Part I indicates, the Supreme Court has used different methods of
analysis in examining religiously-based and politically-based claims of
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability. The Court is deeply
divided on what standard of review to use when evaluating religiously-based
claims; the majority uses rational basis review and the minority prefers strict
scrutiny. On the other hand, the Court appears to have settled on intermediate
scrutiny when evaluating politically-based claims.
The examination in Part II of the historical purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause concludes that the clause was intended to prohibit religious persecution
and to invalidate laws that single out religion for unfavorable treatment, not
neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally (non-purposefully) burden
religious freedom. Thus, in reviewing neutral laws of general applicability
solely on Free Exercise Clause grounds, Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith held
that rational basis review is appropriate. However, Part I.D. demonstrates that
the courts, applying the Speech Clause, use intermediate scrutiny when
examining expressive conduct claims where the regulation is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and when examining content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations. If the Court is to remain neutral in religious matters,
neither preferring nor penalizing religion, the Court should adopt intermediate
scrutiny in all cases involving claims of exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability that incidentally burden the right of conscience implicitly protected
by the Speech Clause. The same level of review should apply whether the basis
for the claim is religious or secular.1 3

212. Marshall, supranote 164, at 585 (citing Pfeffer, supranote 196, at 1120).
213. Of course, under the neutrality principle the Supreme Court could decide to
use rational basis review in all cases involving claims of exemption from neutral,
generally applicable laws. This is the position of Justice Scalia. See supra text
accompanying notes 175-76.
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It remains to describe how the approach advanced in this Article will work
in practice. The following is an attempt to set forth a unified and cohesive mode
of analysis that legislatures and courts can use to determine whether to grant
religiously-neutral exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability.
Critical to this analysis is the need to determine what level of judicial
scrutiny to apply. All authorities agree that if the First Amendment is not
implicated at all by a regulation of conduct (and assuming no other constitutional
rights are implicated), the appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test,
under which virtually all regulations will be upheld. 14 At the other extreme,
most authorities agree that strict scrutiny is to be used in cases where the
challenged regulation is not neutral or generally applicable. BabaluAye and
Johnson stand for the identical proposition: the government cannot single out,
for disfavored treatment, belief or expression with which the
government-presumably speaking for a majority of the people-disagrees. 5
Similarly, in both religion cases and expression cases, the Court should
apply the same standard of review whenever an individual claims an exemption
from a neutral, generally applicable law. Because the individual's action
combines both protected belief or expression and unprotected conduct, an
intermediate standard of review is appropriate. The Court should ask whether
the government's interest is significant or important, and whether the regulation,
using narrowly tailored means, is substantially related to the accomplishment of
that objective.
A. Taking PurposeSeriously
Because the purpose of a challenged law determines whether it is neutral
and generally applicable, which in turn dictates the level of scrutiny, it is
essential that courts take seriously the need to carefully and thoroughly evaluate
the purpose of the challenged law. The problem in O'Brienwas that the Court
abdicated its responsibility. Although the heart of the O'Brien test was the
critical judgment of whether the challenged regulation was "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression,"216 the Court merely accepted the government's
unsubstantiated assertions at face value. There is little doubt but that the purpose
of the statute was to punish persons who burned or otherwise destroyed their
draft cards as a means of political protest, but the Court refused to inquire into
the actual purpose. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated: "It is
a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.... Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous

214. See supranote 28.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 41-51, 69-74.
216. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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matter."2 "7 If the Court will do no more than accept at face value the
government's assertion of its purpose, then it will be a rare case where the
government is so artless or naive as to ascribe an illicit motive to itself. The
result will be that the government, merely by positing a purpose unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, always can avoid strict scrutiny of its regulations
so long as there is merely the pretext of neutrality and general applicability.
The Court corrected itself in Johnson. Holding that flag burning was
expressive conduct-conduct that expresses an idea or belief-Justice Brennan,
for the Court, stated: "In deciding whether particular conduct possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we
have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed iL"' 21 8 In answering this question, Justice Brennan noted that:
Texas concedes as much: "[The statute] reaches only those severe acts
of physical abuse of the flag carried out in a way likely to be
offensive. The statute mandates intentional or knowing abuse, that is,
the kind of mistreatment that is not innocent, but rather is intentionally
designed to seriously offend other individuals.""2 9
Given the wording of the statute and the concession by the State of Texas, it was
not difficult to discern the purpose. The result easily followed: "Ifthere is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."'
A storm of criticism was directed at the Court for its opinion in Johnson.
In an attempt to dampen an effort to amend the Constitution to permit the
punishment of flag burning, Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989,
which made it a federal offense to knowingly mutilate, deface, defile, bum, or
trample upon the American flag, with the sole exception of "disposal of the flag
when it has become worn or soiled."' Under the federal statute, punishment
was not limited to situations where the conduct would offend others. Still, by the
same division of the Court, the statute was invalidated. Although conceding that
the statute "proscribe[d] conduct (other than disposal) that damages or mistreats

217. Id. at 383 (citing cases refusing to inquire into the motives of Congress when
determining if a federal statute falls within its enumerated powers such as the commerce
and taxing powers).
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment protected the sewing of
a peace symbol to the American flag)).
219. Id.
at 411 (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 44, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (No. 88-155).
220. Id at414.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (a)(2) (1989).
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a flag, without regard to the actor's motive, his intended message, or the likely
effects of his conduct on onlookers," and that the statute "contains no explicit
content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct," the Court in United
States v. Eichman held that "it is nevertheless clear that the Government's
asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free expression.""' Thus,
"[a]lthough Congress cast the [Act] in somewhat broader terms than the Texas
statute at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from the same fundamental flaw:
It suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact." m
In other words, even if the statute is carefully drafted to appear to be neutral and
generally applicable on its face, the actual purpose will be determinative.
The same form of analysis used in Eichman should be followed in cases
where an individual claims that the purpose of a law is to impede his or her free
exercise of religion. As difficult as it may be to discern the actual purpose of a
challenged law, the Court must carefully examine all relevant circumstances to
determine that purpose. The task of determining a law's purpose in order to
determine the level of judicial scrutiny is not novel or uncommon. The
examination required in First Amendment cases is not unlike that used in equal
protection cases where a law that is facially neutral and applied neutrally
imposes a disproportionate burden on a protected class; only if the finding of
disparate impact is coupled with a finding of discriminatory intent or purpose is
a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis review triggered. For example, in
Washington v. Davis,224 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
Washington, D.C. regulation that required all applicants for positions in the
police department to pass a written test of verbal skills. The regulation was
racially neutral on its face and as applied, but a disproportionately high
percentage of minority applicants failed the test. The racially disparate impact
or effect, standing alone, was not sufficient to use a standard of review other than
rational basis; it was also necessary to find a racially discriminatory intent or
purpose.' The Court carefully examined the purpose of the regulation and
determined that it was to improve the quality of police officers, not to
discriminate against minority applicants. Thus, the Court refused to use strict
scrutiny, the usual level of scrutiny in racial discrimination cases, and instead
used rational basis review and upheld the regulation. It was the object, intent,
or purpose of the law that determined the level of judicial scrutiny, not the
incidental effect.
Another equal protection case, Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 26 provided the framework for an inquiry into

222. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (quoting Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)).
223. Id. at 317.
224. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
225. Id. at 239, 242.
226. 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
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purpose. For the Court, Justice Powell said that a determination of purpose
"demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available."' 7 He noted:
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes. The specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's
purposes.... Departures from the normal procedural sequence also

might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors
usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a
decision contrary to the one reached. The legislative or administrative
history may be highly relevant, especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports. In some extraordinary instances
the members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning
the purpose of the official action, although even then such testimony
frequently will be barred by privilegem
In these cases involving racially disparate impact, the determination of
purpose determines the level ofjudicial scrutiny. If there is a finding of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose, strict scrutiny is used and the law is invariably
invalidated. But if, as in both Davis and Arlington Heights, there was no
discriminatory purpose or intent, then rational basis review is used and the
regulation is upheld 9
In apart ofhisBabaluAye opinion joined only by Justice Stevens, Justice
Kennedy explicitly adopted the "disparate impact" rationale of equal protection
cases, thereby demonstrating a willingness to examine the decisionmaker's
purpose:
Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council's
object from both direct and circumstantial evidence. Relevant
evidence includes, among other things, the historical background of
the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to

227. Id. at 266.
228. Id. at 267-68 (citations omitted).
229. The same analysis has been used in gender discrimination cases where a
denial of equal protection is alleged. The normal level of scrutiny in gender
discrimination cases is intermediate, not strict, scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976). Therefore, in cases where a law has a disparate impact on one gender,
intermediate scrutiny will be triggered only if there is a finding of discriminatory intent
or purpose. Otherwise, as in the racial impact cases, rational basis review will be used.
See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made
by members of the decisionmaking body. These objective factors bear
on the question of discriminatory object. °
The disparate impact cases provide clear guidance for determining the
actual purpose of challenged legislation. If through a close examination courts
can identify racial or gender discrimination, courts also should be able to discern
attempts to impair religious freedom and freedom of speech and press. The
phrase "religious or political belief" easily can be substituted for "race" in the
Arlington Heights type of inquiry."n

After determining the purpose of the law from which a religious exemption
is claimed, the Court then is in a position to determine if the law is neutral and
of general applicability. If the purpose is to impede religion, as in BabaluAye,"
then the law is not neutral and generally applicable. Strict scrutiny therefore
must be applied and, in all but the rarest of cases, the regulation should be struck
down as violative of the non-persecution principle of the Free Exercise Clause.
However, if the purpose is neutral and generally applicable, as in Smith, the
Court should invoke the implied freedom of conscience of the Speech Clause,
3
apply intermediate scrutiny, and carefully balance the competing interests.2

230. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,540
(1992) (citing Arlington Heights,429 U.S. at 266; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
231. In Establishment Clause cases applying the Lemon test, see Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia both oppose
any judicial inquiry into legislative purpose. See Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those
enacting the statute is ... almost always an impossible task. The number of possible
motivations ... is not binary, or indeed even infinite.... To look for the sole purpose

of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.");
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (The first prong
of Lemon, requiring an inquiry into purpose, is "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis
in the history of the [First Amendment] ..

.,

is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled

results."). If they are unwilling to identify legislative purpose in Establishment Clause
cases, it is no wonder that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia refused to join that
part of Justice Kennedy's BabaluAye opinion that discussed purpose.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 41-51.
233. Beginning free exercise inquiries with an examination of purpose also lends
a certain symmetry to Religion Clause cases. Purpose is the first inquiry undertaken in
Establishment Clause cases under the Lemon test. See supra note 4. Even under Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement" test, purpose along with effect is examined to determine if
government is "endorsing" religion. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. EvaluatingRights IncidentallyBurdened

It is not enough that a challenged regulation is determined to be neutral and
of general applicability. In order to trigger intermediate instead of rational basis
scrutiny, the challenged regulation must impose an incidental burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right other than free exercise because, as Part II
indicated, that Clause standing alone affords no protection from neutral,
generally applicable regulations. Furthermore, in applying intermediate scrutiny,
the equal treatment of religion and non-religion must be assured-which can be
assured only by analyzing the claimant's asserted right under a constitutional
provision other than the Free Exercise Clause. Two such provisions come to
mind: freedom of conscience under the Speech and Press Clauses, and
substantive due process. An analysis of each illustrates the advantages that each
possesses over an ambiguous free exercise right to exemptions from neutral,
generally applicable but incidentally burdensome regulations.
1. Freedoms of Speech and Press
The Speech and Press Clauses afford considerable authority for the process
of evaluating neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden
protected freedoms in a religiously-neutral fashion. State restrictions on
expressive conduct, literature distribution, door-to-door solicitation of funds,
proselytizing in public places, parades, rallies, and similar communicative
activities should be analyzed as freedom of conscience cases under the Speech
Clause. Because such regulations of time, place, and manner must be contentneutral, equality of treatment as between religion and non-religion is assured.
There is no need to invoke the Free Exercise Clause-indeed to do so will result
in rejection of the claim, as that Clause does not afford protection from neutral
laws of general applicability.'

Particularly illustrative is Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna
Consciousness,Inc. ("ISKCON"'). s At issue was Minnesota State Fair Rule
6.05, which required the distribution and sale of literature and the solicitation of
donations from fixed booths rented on a first-come, first-served basisY
ISKCON claimed that "the Rule would suppress the practice of Sankirtan, one
of its religious rituals, which enjoins its members to go into public places to
distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the
Krishna religion." The Minnesota Supreme Court had held "that enforcement
of Rule 6.05 against members of ISKCON would violate their constitutionally

234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra text accompanying notes 192-98.
452 U.S. 640 (1981).
Id. at 642-43.
Id at 645.
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guaranteed right to free exercise of religion." 3 The Minnesota Supreme Court
also held that the application of Rule 6.05 was not "essential" to further the
state's interests, which could have been served by less restrictive means. 9 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, noting that any judicial decision, like the
fair rule itself, applied not only to this one religious organization, but to all
similarly situated organizations:
The Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a view of the State's
interest .... The justification for the rule should not be measured by
the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to
ISKCON. That organization and its ritual of Sankirtan have no special
claim to First Amendment protection as compared to that of other
religions who also distribute literature and solicit funds [although not
as part of a ritual]. Nor ... do religious organizations enjoy rights to
communicate, distribute, and solicit.., superior to those of other
organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to
proselytize. These nonreligious organizations... are entitled to rights
equal to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread
their views .... 240

Finally, the Supreme Court indicated "it is quite improbable that the alternative
means suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court would deal adequately with
the problems posed by the much larger number of distributors and solicitors that
would be present on the fairgrounds" if Rule 6.05 were invalidated."
It is significant that the Supreme Court based its decision on the Speech
Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause. The Court was adamant that it was not
only religious groups, but all groups-secular as well as religious-that had to
be considered in analyzing the regulation. Furthermore, because this was a
neutral law of general applicability, the Court held that intennediate scrutiny, not
strict scrutiny, was appropriate.
In this regard, Heffron exhibited an interesting phenomenon. When the
Minnesota Supreme Court looked at the facts narrowly and determined that it
was only the members of ISKCON who wanted to distribute, sell, and solicit on
the state fair grounds, the court had little difficulty holding in their favor. After
all, members of just one group-well known, if unorthodox in their
activities-did not present great dangers of fraud or impediment to pedestrian
movement. No other religions are known to require its members, as a religious
ritual, to distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations. Thus, the

238. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.
1980), cert. granted,449 U.S. 1109, rev'd, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
239. Id. at 84.
240. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 652-53.
241. Id. at 654.
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Minnesota Supreme Court felt comfortable in applying strict scrutiny and
invalidating the regulation as applied to the one, and probably only, group that
would seek to distribute, sell, and solicit as a religious ritual. On the other hand,
the United States Supreme Court correctly recognized that it was not just the
rights of ISKCON that were at issue; other religious and secular groups would
have the same right to distribute, sell, and solicit. The more persons and groups
who engage in such activity in a confined space, the greater the dangers of fraud
and impediments to pedestrian movement, and thus the greater the interests of
the state in preventing those dangers. Consequently, and perhaps inevitably,
expanding the scope of constitutional protection to include persons and groups
whose belief system is not based on religion could dilute that protection by
lowering the level of scrutiny, as intermediate scrutiny is far more flexible to
deal with these problems than is strict scrutiny. Although Heffron examined a
free speech case, the same phenomenon also would be present when other
constitutional rights are implicated, such as substantive due process.
2. Substantive Due Process
Similarly, substantive due process often can be used in preference to the
Free Exercise Clause to assure that religious and non-religious claims are treated
alike when exemptions from neutral generally applicable laws are claimed. This
rationale would have been a preferred (because it is principled) basis for the
Supreme Court's opinion in Yoder. If there is a due process right of parents to
control the education of their children, it should not matter whether the parents'
views are based on religion, philosophy, or pragmatism. The due process right
of parents to direct the education of their children is no more than one aspect of
the broader substantive due process right of persons to make decisions regarding
procreation,242 child bearing,243 child rearing,2" family living arrangements," 4
and other aspects of family life.2" The presence or absence of a religious basis
for these decisions should be constitutionally irrelevant. Either these personal
rights are protected for all persons, or for none. The following example is
illustrative.
One of the three United States Supreme Court unemployment cases decided
in the wake of Sherbert was Thomas v. Reviev Board ofIndianaEmployment
Security Division,247 inwhich the Review Board of the Indiana Employment
242. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
243. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
244. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
245. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
246. This right also may be characterized as the right of "intimate association."
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
247. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Thomas is one of the three unemployment
compensation cases arising after, and based on, Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See supranote 182.
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Security Division (the "Board") denied unemployment compensation to a
Seventh Day Adventist whose employment was terminated when he refused to
accept a transfer to a department in a factory that manufactured munitions.
Interestingly, the same Board, in Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc.,248 denied benefits
to a restaurant cook who left her employment after being transferred from the
6:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m. shift to the 2:30 p.m.-10:30 p.m. shift.249 Because Gray
could not find adequate child care for her children after the school day ended,
she terminated her employment and applied for unemployment compensation.25 '
Both the Board and the state court of appeals held that Gray's reasons for leaving
her employment did not constitute "good cause in connection with the work."'
Considering both Thomas and Gray together, it is clear that the Board did apply
a neutral policy of general applicability-it did not extend "the construction of
'good cause' to include purely personal and subjective reasons which are unique
to the employee." 2 Because the Board and the Indiana Court of Appeals
considered both religious beliefs and parental obligations to be "purely personal
and subjective reasons which are unique to the employee," both were held to be
outside the meaning of "good cause in connection with the work." ' 3 Therefore,
as the unemployment compensation regulations were neutral and generally
applicable, treating religious and secular claims alike, the Indiana court was right
not to use strict scrutiny in Gray. However, because parental and family rights
were incidentally burdened, this might have been a good case in which to apply
intermediate scrutiny.
The claimant, Gray, appeared to be concerned primarily with the logistics
of arranging child care for her children and transportation to and from work for
herself, and therefore perhaps an application of intermediate scrutiny would not
have disturbed the Board's determination that she was not eligible for
unemployment benefits. But other parents might have far stronger claims.
Consider the single parent who, for either religious or secular reasons, has an
intense, deeply held commitment-under the substantive due process right of
family life-to spending the late afternoons and evenings with his or her
children. The single parent may want to engage in daily evening prayer with his
or her children, or may want to spend several hours supervising homework,
building familial bonds, or both. Therefore, the parent declines or resigns from
employment when work at those times is required. Intermediate scrutiny of the
denial ofbenefits would permit a sensitive balancing of the individual and state
interests. Although Gray might lose on her claim, the other single parent might
prevail-as did Thomas.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

357 N.E.2d 900 (Ind.Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903 (quoting Geckler v. Review Bd., 193 N.E.2d 357, 369 (1963)).
Id. at 902-03.
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Candor compels the recognition that the Supreme Court never has explicitly
invoked intermediate scrutiny to judge substantive due process issues. But there
is no good reason why, if intermediate scrutiny can be used where neutral laws
of general applicability incidentally burden freedom of speech and press, it
cannot also be used where neutral laws of general applicability incidentally
burden substantive due process rights (or, for that matter, fundamental rights
protected by equal protection). Indeed, it may well be that, vithout admitting it,
the Court already uses a method of analysis similar to intermediate scrutiny in
some substantive due process cases. For example, even though the fundamental
"right of privacy" is implicit in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clauses,"' not all limitations on that right are judged under the strict
scrutiny standard of review. Although Zablocki v. Redhair"S held that the right
of privacy encompassed the right to marry, Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court, stated:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any
way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected
to rigorous [i.e., strict] scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter
into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. The
statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere
directly and substantially with the right to marry.
Justice Marshall did not provide a principled basis to distinguish between
the two types of regulations that he recognized: regulations that "interfere
directly and substantially with the right to marry," and "reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship."' W However, by making the distinction, Justice Marshall admits to
varying the level of scrutiny depending, at least in part, on the degree of the
burden placed on the substantive due process right. This suggests balancing, and
opens the door to intermediate scrutiny.zs

254. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
255. 434 U.S. 374,390-91 (1978). Zablocd"struck down a Wisconsin statute that
prohibited marriage without court consent by a "Wisconsin resident having minor issue
not in his custody and which he is under an obligation to support by any court order or
judgnent." Id. at 375 (quoting WIS.STAT. § 245.10(l), (4), (5)(1973)).
256. Id. at 386-87.
257. Id.
258. In fairness to Justice Marshall, it must be noted that he and Justice Stevens,
at least in equal protection cases, rejected the three-tier level of scrutiny in favor of a
"sliding scale" that would balance both the importance of the interest affected, the basis
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Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment in Zablocki, was more explicit.
Disagreeing with Justice Marshall's distinction between two types of regulation,
Justice Powell stated:
[T]he degree of "direct" interference with the decision to marry or to
divorce is unlikely to provide either guidance for state legislatures or
a basis for judicial oversight.
[I]t is fair to say that there is a right of marital and familial privacy
which places some substantive limits on the regulatory power of
government. But the Court has yet to hold that all regulation touching
upon marriage implicates a "fundamental right" triggering the most
exacting [i.e., strict] judicial scrutiny.
[Rather], "when the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements" in a manner which is contrary to deeply
rooted traditions... the means chosen by the State... must bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the object of the legislation.5 9
Justice Powell's "fair and substantial relation" language was derived from
Reed v. Reed,26° the first modem gender discrimination case that has since
evolved into the more recent Craigv. Boren formulation of "substantially related
to the achievement of an important governmental interest."' Thus, in this case
that combined elements of substantive due process and the fundamental rights
prong of equal protection,
Justice Powell invoked what later came to be called
262
intermediate scrutiny.
Another example of the Supreme Court's implicit invocation of
intermediate scrutiny in substantive due process cases is the current trend,

for the classification, and the importance of the government's interest. See, e.g., Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
317 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. Zablocki,434 U.S. at 397-400 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations
omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503-04 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
260. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)).
261. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand
constitutional challenge ...classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
262. Justice Powell would deny using intermediate scrutiny. He believed that the
"fair and substantial" relation test was simply a variation of rational basis review (albeit
"with a bite"). Id. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
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attributed primarily to Justice O'Connor, in abortion cases. The joint opinion in
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey9 rejected strict scrutiny in favor of a test of
whether the abortion regulation imposed an "undue burden" on a pregnant
woman's access to abortion:
As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion
has recognized, not every lav which makes a right more difficult to
exercise is... an infringement of that right [citing access to the ballot
cases]. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, not one
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making
it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be
enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of
the State reach into the heart of [protected] liberty....z
The joint opinion further explained that "[a] finding of an undue burden is a
shorthand for a conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking the abortion of a
non-viable fetus."265
In applying the novel "undue burden" standard, the joint opinion declined
to articulate any specific level of scrutiny. Apparently, under the "undue
burden" test, the first task of a reviewing court is to examine the purpose and
effect of the regulation. If either the purpose or effect of the regulation is to
place a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking [an] abortion," then
the "burden" is "undue" and strict scrutiny is called for. But if neither the
purpose nor effect is to impose a "substantial obstacle," then a lower level of
scrutiny-intermediate or rational basis-is invoked. By examining the purpose
(as well as the effect) of a regulation of abortion, the Court in Planned
Parenthoodclearly opened the door to the possibility of utilizing intermediate
scrutiny of abortion regulations that do not have as their purpose the imposition
of a "substantial obstacle" on a woman's right to an abortion.
The use of intermediate scrutiny in appropriate substantive due process
cases would be consistent with the approach advanced in this Article for the
examination of regulations that burden all First Amendment freedoms. If the
purpose of the regulation is to burden a protected constitutional right, be it
religious freedom in Babalu Aye, freedom of speech in Texas v. Johnson, or
abortion in Roe v. Wade,26 strict scrutiny is to be used to invalidate the
regulation. Conversely, if the purpose of a neutral generally applicable law is
not to burden a protected constitutional right, incidental burdens on the right

263.
264.
265.
266.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 867.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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should be judged by intermediate scrutiny. As explained in Part II, however, it
is not the Free Exercise Clause that is to be invoked. Rather, it is the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment with its implied right of conscience, or the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, that will form the basis
for a constitutional analysis of a neutral law of general applicability that
incidentally burdens constitutionally protected rights.
C. Applying IntermediateScrutiny to Prior
Supreme Court Cases
Since 1963, when Sherbert first held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard ofjudicial review in free exercise cases, the Supreme Court has decided
twenty free exercise cases, including Sherbert. Thirteen of these cases,
purporting to use strict scrutiny, rejected Free Exercise Clause challenges.267
Obviously, had intermediate scrutiny been used instead of strict scrutiny, the
result in all thirteen cases would have been the same. If a challenged regulation
can survive strict scrutiny, then surely it can survive a lower level of scrutiny.
Four cases (Sherbertand three others') upheld Free Exercise Clause challenges
to the denial of unemployment compensation. For reasons stated earlier, 69 these
cases were correctly decided because "where the State has in place a system of
individualized exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason.""27 Babalu Aye was the only
case to examine a statute that purposefully penalized a particular theological
belief. Because the regulation was not neutral or generally applicable, the Court
rightly applied strict scrutiny and held the ordinances unconstitutional.
Thus, of the twenty free exercise cases decided in 1963 and thereafter,
eighteen of the cases would not have been affected by the mode of analysis
advocated in this Article. Only two cases remain: Yoder, which applied strict
scrutiny and upheld a free exercise challenge to a neutral law of general
applicability, and Smith, which applied rational basis review and rejected a free
exercise challenge to a neutral law of general applicability. Both should have
been analyzed using intermediate scrutiny, which may or may not have changed
the outcome.

267. See supratext accompanying notes 177-80.
268. See supranote 182.
269. See supratext accompanying notes 181-91.
270. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
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1. Wisconsin v. Yoder
As explained above 7 in Yoder, members of the Old Order Amish faith
opposed compulsory education after the eighth grade. Because Chief Justice
Burger determined that the application of the law to the Amish violated their free
exercise rights, he applied strict scrutiny and held that Wisconsin's neutral
generally applicable compulsory education law could not constitutionally be
applied to Old Order Amish.2' In so doing, the Chief Justice focused on the
practices of the Old Order Amish-practices that are shared by few if any other
religious or non-religious organizations. Thus, Chief Justice Burger repudiated
the principle of government neutrality in religious matters. Not only did he
needlessly favor religion over non-religion, but also he manifested a preference
for one religion over others.
The similarity of Yoder to Heffron is striking. Reviewing this neutral law
of general applicability that incidentally burdened a religious group, the Court
rejected free exercise analysis and strict scrutiny used by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, and instead invoked the Speech Clause and applied intermediate
scrutinyY' The same analysis used in Heffron should have been used in Yoder
to the challenge to compulsory school attendance. Just as the Court inHeffron
based its decision on the Speech Clause instead of the Free Exercise Clause, so
too the Court in Yoder should have based its decision on the Due Process Clause
instead of the Free Exercise Clause. The substantive due process right ofparents
to control the education of their children would have been a preferred--and more
principled-basis for the decision in Yoder.274 The Old Order Amish should
have received no benefit that was not also provided to other religious and nonreligious organizations and individuals who, on grounds of
conscience-religious, moral, ethical, philosophical or political-opposed
compulsory education after the eighth grade. Furthermore, just as the Court used
intermediate scrutiny in Heffron, so too should the Court have used intermediate
scrutiny in Yoder.
It is important to recall that the focus on different rights in Heffron by the
Minnesota Supreme Court (free exercise) and the United States Supreme Court
(free speech) resulted in different levels of scrutiny. The Minnesota Supreme
Court decided the case on free exercise grounds, and recognized that ISKCON
was probably the only religious group to require its members, as a religious
ritual, to distribute and sell literature and to solicit donations. Thus, it was not
271. See supra text accompanying notes 204-12.
272. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234-35 (1972).

273. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,65253 (1981); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); supra notes 166-69,

235-41 and accompanying text.
274. Alternatively, the Court could have relied upon the Speech Clause to give an
exemption from compulsory school attendance to both religious and non-religious groups
and persons. See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
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difficult to apply strict scrutiny and exempt a single organization from the state
fair rule. However, the United States Supreme Court recognized that its holding
in the case also must apply to other religious and non-religious organizations and
individuals who might have wanted to distribute, sell, and solicit. Therefore, in
order to prevent the potential disruption of the fair that would be caused by
blanket exemptions to all who wanted to distribute, sell, and solicit, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny. This permitted the Court to carefully review the
facts and sensitively balance the competing interests of the individuals and the
government.
The same mode of analysis should apply in cases challenging compulsory
education. Under this approach, Yoder was correctly decided. But also under
this approach, other parents also would be exempted from compulsory education
laws, even though they are neutral and generally applicable. Christian
fundamentalists might object to public education because they perceive that
public education is secular, opposed to family values, and anti-religion. Parents,
whether religious or not, may believe that public schools-and even private
schools-are unsafe, posing a threat to the physical safety of their children.
Some may believe that illegal drugs are too prevalent in all schools. Some may
believe that schools in their community are academically deficient. The list is
endless. For a myriad of complex reasons, parents might prefer home schooling
to organized education. In each and every case, the reviewing court, applying
intermediate scrutiny, carefully must examine all claims-whether based on
religious or secular beliefs-and sensitively balance the competing interests.
2. Employment Division, DepartmentofHuman Resources v. Smith
In deciding to use rational basis review in Smith, the outcome of the case
was a foregone conclusion; the majority of the Court gave maximum deference
to the state and upheld the challenged regulation. Similarly, by their insistence
on using strict scrutiny, dissenting Justices Blackmun, Brernan, and Marshall
almost inevitably concluded that the denial of an exemption from a prohibition
on the use of peyote was not necessary to serve the compelling state interest of
curbing "the
vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this
275
country.1

Closest to but still off the mark in Smith was the concurring opinion of
Justice O'Connor. In common with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
(all of whom joined the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion explaining the
appropriate level of scrutiny), Justice O'Connor insisted that "the compelling
interest test" was the appropriate test.27 6 Nevertheless, a close reading of her
opinion suggests that perhaps she favored something less than strict scrutiny.

275. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 916 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 894, 895, 897, 900, 901 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Although asserting that the state's interest must be compelling, nowhere in her
opinion did Justice O'Connor insist that the state use the least restrictive means.
Rather, on several occasions she used the term "narrowly tailored," m which is
the language of both strict and intermediate scrutiny 7 Furthermore, rejecting
the Smith majority's "categorical rule" that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability,"' 279 Justice O'Connor asserted that:
[I]n each of the... cases cited by the Court in favor of its categorical
rule... , we rejected the particular constitutional claims before us
only after carefully weighing the competing interests.... [T]he First
Amendment at least requires a case-by-case determination of the
question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim.... [D]elicate
balancing [is] required by our decisions in Sherbertand Yoder p '
Justice O'Connor also recognized the similarity between religion and speech
claims: "Our free speech cases similarly recognize that neutral regulations that
affect free speech values are subject to a balancing, rather than a categorical,
approach."z' Finally, she noted "that courts have been quite capable of applying
our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing state interests."nm
Justice O'Connor's constant references to case-by-case determinations,
sensitivity to the facts of particular claims, the careful weighing of competing
interests, delicate balancing, and sensible balances evokes an intermediate
standard of review, not strict scrutiny. A careful reading of the last part of
Justice O'Connnr's opinion (which no other Justices joined), in which she
carefully balanced the competing interests, reinforces the view that, although she
referred to "the compelling interest test," which suggests strict scrutiny, in reality
she was using intermediate scrutiny. Had she truly used strict scrutiny, it is
difficult to understand how she could conclude that the denial of an exemption
from a prohibition of the use of peyote (in which there is little illegal traffic), as
distinguished from the use of heroin, cocaine, or even marijuana (in which there
is significant illegal traffic), served a compelling interest. It is even more
difficult to understand how she could decide that broadly proscribing the use of
drugs such as peyote, for which there is little market, is a narrowly tailored (let
alone the least restrictive) means of prohibiting the illegal trafficking of the more
277. Id. at 894, 895.
278. See supranote 78.
279. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
280. d. at 896, 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 902 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47
(1986); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968)).
282. Id.
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dangerous addictive drugs such as heroin and cocaine. But because intermediate
scrutiny gives much discretion to the judiciary to determine if the government's
interest is "important, substantial, or significant," and to determine if the means
are sufficiently "narrowly tailored," Justice O'Connor's conclusion is far more
compatible with intermediate scrutiny than it is with strict scrutiny. Thus,
although Justice O'Connor did not explicitly use intermediate scrutiny, her
approach certainly suggests an appropriate outcome had that test been applied
to the facts of Smith.
3. City ofBoerne v. Flores
Although not decided on First Amendment grounds, the Free Exercise
Clause was implicated in Boerne."3 In that case, a Catholic church in Boerne,
Texas, had been denied permission to build an addition to the church, which
previously had received the designation of an "historic landmark." 2 4 Although
the decision was based on a finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was unconstitutional because it was outside the scope of the enumerated powers
of Congress," 5 several Justices discussed the underlying free exercise issue and
the appropriate level of scrutiny that should be applied. Justices Scalia and
Stevens adhered to their view in Smith "that the Constitution's Free Exercise
Clause 'does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).""' 28 6 Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, who came to the Court after Smith was
decided, also adhered to her views in Smith. Again, Justice O'Connor would
require the "government to justify [a challenged] law with a compelling state
interest and to use means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."2 7
It is particularly noteworthy that, in her argument that religiously-based
claims of exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability deserved
constitutional protection, Justice O'Connor equated religion with speech,
demanding that both be accorded constitutional protection using heightened
scrutiny:
Certainly, it is in no way anomalous to accord heightened protection
to a right identified in the text of the First Amendment. For example,
it has long been the Court's position that freedom of speech-a right

283. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.

284. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
285. Id. at 511.
286. Id.at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
287. Id. at 546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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enumerated only in a few words after the right to free exercise--has
special constitutional status. Given the centrality of freedom ofspeech
and religion to the American concept of personal liberty, it is
altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated with the
highest degree of respect."8
Not only is it "altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated
with the highest degree of respect," but also that both be treated with equal
respect and be adjudicated under the same level of judicial scrutiny-strict
scrutiny where the purpose of the challenged law is to restrict speech or religion,
and intermediate scrutiny where an exemption is claimed from a neutral law of
general applicability.89 Once again, Justice O'Connor hints at a mode of
analysis that is neutral as between religion and non-religion.
Although none of the Justices discussed the applicability ofthe intermediate
standard of review to the facts of Boerze, this analysis would not be difficult.
Once again, because the challenge is to a neutral law of general applicability'
the Free Exercise Clause furnishes no independent authority to invalidate the
law.2" However, the Speech Clause, with its implied right of conscience, easily
could have been asserted. In Boenze, the church argued that it needed to build
an addition to accommodate more parishioners who desired to attend religious
services in the church. Similarly, the owner of an auditorium or theater might
argue that an expansion is needed to accommodate more persons who desire to
attend the auditorium or theater for political rallies or drama productions. A
newspaper might argue that an addition is needed to its printing plant to print
more newspapers to accommodate an increased number of subscribers. The
principle of government neutrality in religious matters requires that all three
claims be treated alike.
The issue in all three cases should be whether the First Amendment requires
that buildings used for First Amendment purposes be exempt from neutral laws
that are generally applicable to all historic landmarks. If the historic preservation
law includes a system of individualized hearings on whether to grant exemptions
from the operation of the law, then religious and secular reasons both must be
considered by the agency empowered to grant exemptions.tm If no exemptions
are permitted by the law, then the reviewing court should apply intermediate
scrutiny, carefully examine the facts, and sensitively balance the competing
interests. It is difficult to see how the church, the auditorium, or the printing
plant could be treated differently from each other from a First Amendment
standpoint Using intermediate scrutiny, all First Amendment uses of property

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 564-65.
Id.
But see infra text accompanying notes 294-95.
See supratext accompanying notes 158-69.
See supra text accompanying notes 181-84.
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with landmark designations should receive more protection than economic uses
of similar property. Depending on a "case-by-case determination of the
question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim,"'
some First
Amendment uses might be granted an exemption from neutral landmark
preservation laws of general applicability; others might not.
It should be noted that neither substantive due process nor the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment,' to the extent that they protect property rights
rather than personal rights, affords special protection to the church, the
auditorium, the newspaper's printing plant, or any other user of property.
Although landmark designation laws, in common with zoning and other land use
regulations, typically are neutral as between religion and non-religion, and as
between different ideas and beliefs of the owners or occupants, they are not
neutral with regard to the property itself. By their very nature, land use
regulations are neither neutral nor generally applicable-different types of
property are treated differently. But because the grounds for distinction do not
implicate any constitutional rights other than property rights, the grounds for
different treatment are not subjected to heightened review except to determine
whether there is a compensable taking and, if so, the consequences thereof,29
which presents issues beyond the scope of this Article. If land use regulations
that are not neutral or generally applicable are judged by rational basis review,
then neutral land use laws of general applicability should not receive heightened
scrutiny.
Conversely, perhaps substantive due process would demand the use of
intermediate scrutiny to examine the denial of an exemption from a land use
regulation that burdens a personal right protected under substantive due process.
For example, an abortion clinic housed in a landmarked building may seek an
exemption from a landmark law to permit the construction of an addition to
accommodate an increased number of physicians, staff, and patients. Just as
293. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
294. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("... nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation").
295. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
For example, in determining when government conditions on development are
considered to be a taking, in Dolan the Supreme Court applied a two-part test. First,
there must be a nexus between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition. See
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. Second, the conditions must be "roughly proportionate" to the

government's justifications for the conditions. Id. at 391. Although the Court said that
this was a test of reasonableness, it used the term "rough proportionality" to prevent

confusion with the rational basis test. Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that "[n]o
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. This suggests intermediate
scrutiny.
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those occupants of landmarked buildings who use their buildings to exercise
First Amendment rights should be able to invoke intermediate scrutiny to
measure their claims for exemptions to land use regulations, so too should
owners or occupants who use their buildings to exercise fundamental substantive
due process rights.
D. Applying IntermediateScrutiny to Other Cases
In her opinion inBoerne,Justice O'Connor cited four lower court decisions,
decided in the aftermath of Smith, that rejected Free Exercise Clause claims to
neutral laws of general applicability.1 6 A review of these cases shows that all
of them could have had different outcomes had the courts followed the approach
urged here.
2 97

1. Yang v. Sturner

In Yang v. Sturner, a federal district judge permitted a suit to be brought
against a medical examiner who conducted an autopsy of the plaintiffi' deceased
son. The Yangs, who immigrated from Laos, "adhere[d] to the religious beliefs
of the Hmongs, one of which prohibit[ed] any mutilation of the body, including
autopsies or the removal of organs during an autopsy."'
The autopsy was
conducted pursuant to a neutral, generally applicable law that authorized
autopsies in situations similar to those at issue in this case, and the Yangs were
not notified of the autopsy in advance or asked for their permission. 9 Applying
strict scrutiny, the district court held for the plaintiffsY* Pending a hearing on
damages, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Smith. The district court then
withdrew its prior opinion and, claiming to adhere to Smith, held that the neutral,
generally applicable law's impairment of religious freedom did not rise to a level
that offended the Constitution.3 "
Yang was a case that, like Yoder, could have been decided on substantive
due process grounds. Perhaps there should be a generally recognized right to
bodily integrity; the right to control one's body is suggested by cases and
commentators advocating judicial recognition of the right to refuse medical

296. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 547 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
297. 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990).
298. Id. at 846.
299. IM2
300. Id.
at 857.
301. See Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.1. 1990).
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treatment,3 2 the right to an abortion,3 3 the right to die,3 and the right to
physician-assisted suicide.3"' To be sure, the Court's record on these matters is
mixed. However, it is not the purpose of this Article to advocate for or against
such a right. Rather, the point is that, to the extent courts grant exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability to laws mandating medical treatment or
otherwise interfering with bodily integrity and personal autonomy, such
exemptions cannot be limited to those based on religious belief. If the religious
beliefs of a Jehovah's Witness necessitate an exemption from compulsory
medical attention statutes, so too should exemptions be given to others who,
because of non-religious beliefs and value systems, also resist such government
encroachments over their bodies. The district court in Yang could have based its
opinion on the view that substantive due process necessitates the use of
intermediate scrutiny to determine if the performance of an autopsy was
narrowly tailored to serve an important or substantial state interest in
determining the cause of death of a young man who apparently was in good
health but where there was no suspicion of foul play. Although other obstacles
might preclude a decision in favor of the parents,3" at least the district court
could have grounded its decision on a religiously neutral principle of
constitutional law.
0
2. CornerstoneBible Church v. City ofHastings

7

Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings examined a Downtown
Revitalization Plan, designed to preserve and restore the central business district
where churches were not permitted."' However, there was evidence that other
non-commercial uses were permitted in the downtown area, including Alcoholics
Anonymous, a pregnancy counseling center, the American Legion, the Veterans
of Foreign Wars, and the Masonic Lodge.3 Applying the categorical rule of
Smith, the Eighth Circuit rejected the claim that the denial of an exemption from
the neutral and generally applicable zoning law offended the Free Exercise

302. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 110 (1905).
303. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
305. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
306. The Supreme Court in Cruzan did not permit parents of a patient in a
persistent vegetative state to act as surrogates to exercise a personal right of the patient,
at least where state law required clear and convincing evidence of the personal views of
the patient. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285-86. By analogy, the Court might hold that, in
the absence of evidence as to the decedent's views about autopsies, the decedent's family
cannot make the decision, as the surrogates of the decedent, to either permit or object to
the autopsy.

307. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
308. Id. at 466.
309. Id. at 468.
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Clause ? Nevertheless that court remanded the case to the district court" for
a determination of whether, under either the Speech Clause alone or conjoined
with the Free Exercise Clause in a "hybrid" claim, the zoning ordinance was a
content neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of exercising First
Amendment rights.3 This was precisely the correct approach.3 t Because
organizations that were religious, political, or ideological in character were
permitted to be housed in the downtown area, the regulation apparently was not
content neutral from a First Amendment standpoint. Consequently, strict
scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of scrutiny, and the unequal treatment
between Cornerstone Bible Church and the other organizations probably cannot
be justified.
4
3. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City ofNew York"1

In St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, a church brought suit
against New York City's Landmarks Preservation Commission, which had
denied the church permission to construct either a fifty-nine or, alternatively, a
forty-seven story office tower in place of the church's adjacent community
house.3 " Both the church and the community house had been designated
landmarks?16 Had it not been for the Free Exercise Clause claim, the case would
have been on all fours with the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City.317 Using rational basis review, Penn
Centralupheld the authority of the city to enact the landmark preservations law,
rejecting due process and Takings Clause objections to the denial of permission
to construct either a fifty-five, or, alternatively, a fifty-three story office tower
on top of Penn Central station.3 "
The free exercise issue in St. Bartholomew'sChurch was indistinguishable
from the issue underlying Boerne.319 Because the law was neutral and of general
applicability, the Second Circuit in St. Bartholomew's Church applied the
rationale of Smith, decided several months earlier, and denied an exemption that
was claimed on free exercise grounds.320 Although the court observed that "[ilt
is obvious that the Landmarks Law has drastically restricted the Church's ability
310. Id.
at470-71.
311. There isno reported decision of the district court following the remand.
312. Cornerstone,948 F.2d at 470-71.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 290-93.
314. 914 F.2d 348 (2dCir. 1990).
315. Id. at 351.
316. Id.
317. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
318. Id.
at 138.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 283-95.
320. See St.Bartholomew's Church v.City of New York,914 F.2d 348, 351 (2d
Cir. 1990).
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to raise revenues to carry out [and expand] its various charitable and ministerial
programs," the court made no effort to determine if other secular organizations
protected by the First Amendment also were burdened by the Landmarks Law.321
Had the court found that these protected secular organizations were equally
burdened, it should have followed the precedent of Hleffron," applied
intermediate scrutiny, and engaged in a fact-sensitive balancing of the competing
interests, which could have resulted in a different outcome.
4. Minnesota v. Hershberger2
In Minnesota v. Hershberger (Hershberger1), the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required that Amish be exempt from a
requirement that they exhibit a "slow moving vehicle" ("SMV") emblem on the
back of their horse-drawn buggies. 3' Because the Amish had a sincere religious
belief prohibiting them from exhibiting the emblem, 3" the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny. 326 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.32 7 On remand,328 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
SMV law, as applied to the Amish, violated the "freedom of conscience"
protected by the Minnesota Constitution.329 Thus, there was no need to
reconsider the federal constitutional issue.
Viewed as a First Amendment freedom of speech case, Hershbergeris
strikingly similar to Wooley,3 ° which held that a Jehovah's Witness could not be
punished for making illegible that portion of his New Hampshire automobile
license plate that contained the state motto "Live Free or Die." Noting that the
Maynards found the state motto to be "morally, ethically, religiously, and
politically abhorrent,, 33 ' the Supreme Court held that the right not to be
compelled to express ideas with which one disagreed was part of "the broader

321. Id. at 355.
322. See supra text accompanying note 235-41.
323. 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989).

324. Id. at 289.
325. The Amish asserted that "the 'loud' colors required and the 'worldly symbols'
the triangular shape represent[ed] to them conflict[ed] with the admonitions found in
Apostle Paul's Epistles." Id. at 284. To the Amish, compliance with the law "would be
putting their faith in 'worldly symbols' rather than in God." Id.
326. Id. at 285.
327. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
328. See Minnesota v. Hershberger (Hershberger II), 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1990).
329. MrNN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.
331. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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concept of 'individual freedom of [the] mind,"' thereby recognizing the
inherent unity of the First Amendment.
Just as the Court preferred to rely on the Speech Clause rather than the Free
Exercise Clause in Wooley, so too the Minnesota Supreme Court inHershberger
Ishould have relied on the Speech Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause.
In so doing, the Minnesota court could have ensured that religious and secular
objections to compelled speech were treated similarly. Because the laws in both
cases compelled owners of automobiles and buggies to express ideas and convey
messages to which they objected, the laws regulated speech itself Because both
laws were not merely neutral and generally applicable regulations of conduct
that only incidentally burdened speech, strict rather than intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Although the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment require the
government to remain neutral in religious matters, the United States Supreme
Court has completely abdicated its constitutionally imposed responsibility to
safeguard this bedrock principle of American constitutional law. By using
different tests in Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause cases, and in
free exercise and free speech cases, the Court has utterly failed to set forth a
comprehensive over-arching theory of the First Amendment. Government
neutrality in matters of religion is hardly more than an aspiration, if the Court
even continues to aspire to this principle.
The muddled analysis of the Court is nowhere more apparent than in cases
involving claims of exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability that
incidentally, in a non-purposeful manner, burden religious, moral, ethical,
philosophical, and political belief. If the law burdens political beliefs, the
Justices overwhelmingly favor using intermediate scrutiny, which necessitates
a delicate and sensitive balancing of competing interests. But if the law burdens
religious beliefs, the Court is deeply divided between two groups ofJustices who
use the polar extremes of rational basis scrutiny and strict scrutiny. The problem
is exacerbated by the Court's failure to articulate, in a principled manner, the
differences between strict and intermediate scrutiny.
This Article has attempted to suggest a mode of analysis that would
recognize the essential unity of the First Amendment and bring some consistency
to this area of constitutional jurisprudence. The goal of government neutrality
in religious matters can be achieved by recognizing the meaning of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Speech Clauses. First, this requires a
recognition that the core meaning of "free exercise of religion" is limited
primarily to freedom from religious persecution by government. Second, courts

332. Id at 714 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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must recognize that the Speech Clause contains a necessarily implied "freedom
of conscience" that is broad enough to encompass all beliefs, religious and
secular.
The First Amendment, properly understood, therefore requires a careful
identification of the purpose of the challenged law. If the purpose of the law is
to burden constitutionally-protected freedoms, strict scrutiny should be used and,
in all but the rarest of instances, the law should be invalidated. If the purpose is
not to burden protected freedoms, intermediate scrutiny should be applied to all
claims of exemption from neutral laws of general applicability. The name and
character of the right burdened-freedom of religion, freedom of expression, or
fundamental unenumerated freedoms protected by substantive due
process-should not be material. In this way, religiously motivated conduct will
be no more protected and no less protected than conduct motivated by
philosophical, moral, ethical, and political beliefs. Consequently there is no need
to define the meaning of "religion" or determine the sincerity (and therefore the
veracity) of religious beliefs.
Adopting this mode of analysis would accomplish a major step forward in
eliminating the internal inconsistencies of the First Amendment. In turn, this will
begin to harmonize the various provisions of our Constitution's foremost
protection of individual rights.
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